

Throughout the treatise, the American soldier-reader will sense an immediate familiarity. Ewald hews to the same principles that guide our tactical thought and leadership today. In the field of combat leadership, Ewald appears to have been at the leading and lonely edge of his time. Leadership by example and shared hardships could not have been popular in an era marked for its class distinctions. Ewald's recognition of the impact of situational dynamics, what we now call the analysis of METT-T, and his encouragement of initiative are taken for granted as leadership traits today.

Selig and Skaggs' translation and commentary of Ewald's *Treatise on Partisan Warfare* were done to add to the history and to the understanding of the American Revolutionary War. Their work completely satisfies that objective with a broader collateral benefit. It is an exemplary resource for anyone interested in the development and history of light infantry and irregular warfare. Every light infantryman, Ranger and Special Forces soldier who reads it will be nodding his head in agreement with Ewald's concepts, thoughts and standards. The editors have done a masterful job of bringing to life the historical figure and the ideas of Johann Ewald.

LTC John F. Mulholland
Fort Bragg, N.C.

Losing Mogadishu — Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia. By Jonathan Stevenson. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. ISBN 1-55750-788-0. 183 pages. \$24.95.

Soldiers and politicians are still talking about it — it seems that nearly everyone has a different perspective on what went wrong.

Forty-three Americans died in Somalia — 18 of them in one now-famous combat action for which two special-operations soldiers were posthumously awarded Medals of Honor.

While there may be much to criticize about U.S. and U.N. operations in Somalia, Jonathan Stevenson seems to forget that President George Bush, a politician, made the ill-advised decision to enter the quicksand that was Somalia. After that, the American military was stuck with a tar baby that it had never wanted and had advised against.

Stevenson's primary background is in journalism. When he discusses military operations, he is clearly out of his depth. He does not fully understand the American military nor the inherent difficulty of military operations conducted under the auspices of the U.N. What Stevenson fails to comprehend is that the American military is a very blunt instrument of national policy. Marines are not diplomats, nor should they be confused with diplomats. We would never ask a foreign-service officer to conduct a ground assault on an enemy posi-

tion, but American policy-makers appear more than willing to ask a 19-year-old Marine to act the role of cross-cultural facilitator between feuding Somali factions in the streets of Mogadishu.

This reviewer would even take the author to task over the title of the book, *Losing Mogadishu — Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia*, for two reasons. First, Mogadishu was never America's to win or lose. It is not worthwhile to think of post-Cold War issues in this light. Mogadishu gratefully belongs to Somalis alone. Second, our actions in Somalia reflect no U.S. policy of which I am aware. What "test" is the author speaking about?

Fortunately, Stevenson's book is more focused on the politics surrounding the Somalia debacle, and he provides a very credible chronology of significant events throughout his narrative. But I am at odds with Stevenson's view of the world. He finds endless fault with American policies, views the U.N. as an American puppet, and concerns himself with the "image" of the U.N.

Despite these many criticisms, Stevenson's work is enjoyable reading. Stevenson apparently spent much time in Somalia, and his insights into Somali clan warfare are excellent. The fact that he knows many of the major players in the region also gives his analysis greater credibility.

If you will view this book for what it is — one idealistic journalist's attempt to capture the truth of Somalia, the book is worth reading. If you expect a trenchant, in-depth and objective military-political analysis, look elsewhere.

LTC Robert B. Adolph Jr.
Joint Special Operations Cmd.
Fort Bragg, N.C.



