

previous camp (old Lang Vei), Khe Sanh, the Laotian border, the Laotian unit's location, roads and the location of the involved forces. The book's only graphic presentation is a sketch of the camp, which is presented next to an aerial photo. The sketch and the photo were apparently made at different times and from different directions. Even after carefully studying the included road patterns and making allowances for later construction, it is impossible to orient the two presentations.

Phillips' account is further disabled by his lack of understanding of the Vietnam-era Special Forces and of the various programs and organizations that they developed and manned. For instance, he makes excessive distinctions between members of the Civilian Irregular Defense Force's camp strike force and its Mike Force, repeatedly characterizing the latter as "mercenaries." The role of the SOG personnel is even further beyond his ken.

In summation, other than some of the individual interviews that it includes, *Night of the Silver Stars* has little to recommend it. Certainly it does not deserve a place in the Special Forces soldier's professional library. Possibly, if read in conjunction with Stockwell's book, John Plaster's *SOG*, and some of the accounts of the Khe Sanh siege, it may assist in forming a better overall picture.

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Elements of Military Strategy: An Historical Approach. By Archer Jones. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishing, 1996. ISBN: 0-275-95527-3 (paper). 264 pages. \$24.95.

Elements of Military Strategy is well-written — the author is clear and concise in his technique, and from the perspective of strategy, his case studies seem

to have been well-chosen.

The author takes care in his preface to tell the reader that the book will address strategy at "an elementary level." This is true. Jones covers strategy with a very light touch, and his focus appears to be mainly explanatory.

Jones also tells us that he will deal "with only some of the elements of military strategy." This is also true. His book jumps from chapter to chapter, held together only by chronology — the early Indian Wars in the United States; World War II submarine warfare in the Atlantic; air warfare over Europe; the Pacific campaigns of Nimitz and MacArthur; the Korean Conflict and Vietnam; and the Persian Gulf War.

Essentially, Jones is a storyteller. Other than the fact that all the discussion is generally about American military campaigns, the book appears to have no thread of purpose.

Unfortunately, Jones sometimes blurs the line between tactics, operational art and strategy. He seems far removed from any serious discussion of modern strategy and the use of its nomenclature, using the term

"calvary of the air," for instance, to describe modern air forces.

There are bright spots: Jones' chapter on the WW II Pacific campaign is particularly interesting. And in his examination of the Vietnam War, Jones does make some good points about the way the U.S. Marines in the early part of that conflict actually trumped the Viet Cong by using well-organized civic action. Unfortunately, Jones glosses over the contributions made by Army Special Forces, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs personnel.

As a professor at the Command and General Staff College, Jones held the Morrison Chair of Military History. *Elements of Strategy* may be a loose collection of some of his lectures, but his effort lacks a central guiding light. Other than the fact that some parts of the book make reasonably good reading, there is little to recommend this volume.

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