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Military Intelligence

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TERRORISM: The causal factors

The Italian Red Brigades and the West German Baader-Meinhof Gang

by Capt. Robert B. Adolph Jr.

Introduction

Who are the terrorists? Where do they come from? Why do they choose terror to achieve their goals? What is at the heart of their motivation?

The above questions have perplexed Western society from the late sixties to the present. The actual manifestations of terrorism are well-known. Political murder, kidnapping, bombing and the slaughter of innocents are well documented. These incidents are thrust upon our consciousness through the auspices of the mass media. News coverage of this type serves only the terrorist, since often the primary goal of the terrorist is to achieve nationwide or worldwide attention for his cause. The incidents of terrorism and their effect on their target audience is largely outside the scope of this article. What will be primarily addressed are the causal factors and, hopefully, at least a partial answer to the **why** of terrorism.

The focus of this analysis is on two countries: West Germany and Italy. Both serve as excellent examples of post industrial Western nations. Both countries suffered defeat at the hands of the Allied powers in World War II, both have a fascist history and both are today considered progressive democratic countries genuinely concerned about the

welfare of their populations. West Germany, in particular, has erected a social welfare state which handles the needs of the poor in exemplary fashion.

The two terrorist organizations that will be discussed are the Red Brigades of Italy and the Baader-Meinhof Gang of West Germany.

Commonalities of Italian and German Terrorism of the Left

First it would be useful to define terrorism and to discuss the causal factors common to both countries. Although there appears to be no universally accepted definition, the following should suffice: Terrorism is the weapon of the weak. It is political violence designed to create a climate of fear in a target population. Its purpose in Western societies is to facilitate the downfall of the government in office. Through violence, the terrorist hopes to discredit the government by proving to the population that its government cannot protect the people. It is the weapon of the weak because those who have power seek to protect it. Those without power have nothing to protect and nothing to lose.

A critical element in this terrorist plan is the mass media. Newspapers, magazines and, most of all, television provide the terrorist with the perfect vehicle for spreading the fear so necessary to his goals. Without the media, terrorism could not hope to have the global effect it's

had over the last 15 years. Terrorism is often **well orchestrated** political violence not directed at the immediate victims of the act, but instead at the larger audience of the population.

The terrorist movements of West Germany and Italy are predominantly left-wing; but unlike the Marxist view of revolution, they (the terrorists) are not members of the oppressed proletariat. They are instead representative of the bourgeoisie, or the middle and upper-middle classes. They are the children of bureaucrats, professional people and well-to-do businessmen. They are the affluent offspring of our democratic societies. These persons provide the cadre of modern terrorism. "What is, however, far more difficult to understand is the spectacle of individuals who seem to have no objective reasons for complaining about their material condition and their place in society, becoming completely alienated and turning to the most extreme movements, with the aim of destroying the very society that provides them with very generous benefits."¹

It is the university system that has borne the brunt of responsibility for the creation of these malcontents. It is here that the young mind is introduced to Marx, Engels, Lenin, Castro, Ho Chi Minh and others. It is the university that provides a far reaching look at the rest of the world: a world that is largely in

poverty. At the same time, the student enjoys the leisure and affluence of Western society. It is the children of the wealthy who seem to share a collective guilt for the lot of the poor. After all, these children have done nothing to earn their status. That which they have has been given to them.

This is not to say that the children of wealth all feel this guilt. They do not. There is a minority of them that do have feelings of this nature, and it is these students that are ripe fruit for a terrorist cause. The artificial environment of the university nurtures these feelings of the young of the upper and middle classes. Leftist professors extol the virtues of socialism and the decadence of the capitalist society in which they live. The contradictions of Western society provide fertile fields for the sowing of such seeds.

Radical ideas are not unheard of in the poorer quarters of the alienated, disenfranchized, oppressed and victimized classes; but even they, for the most part, are willing to work through the bureaucracy to achieve their goals. Poor working men attempting to keep their families fed and clothed are not likely to turn to insurrection as a primary means to improve their lot when other means exist. Those means do exist in West Germany and to a lesser degree in Italy today. It would seem that, although the extolers of terrorism today claim they are working for the poor, the poor would find little in common with the terrorists themselves. With the benefit of liberal university education, the dedicated terrorist simply argues that the masses have to be led to revolution, and who better for the job than himself? Of course, there are examples of blue-collar terrorists, but it should be noted that they are in the distinct minority.

Most terrorists grow up in an affluent home and have nearly all their material needs cared for.

Their most pressing daily problems might revolve around what to wear to school and how to spend their allowance. They do not have to struggle to obtain anything. It is often a home where the parents substitute material goods for their time and care. At a time when parental guidance is most crucial, namely adolescence, many children of

... terrorism is exciting. For the bored, over-indulged and alienated children of wealth, violence is the ultimate form of self-expression, freedom and self-indulgence. . .

wealthy families are left to fend for themselves. This neglect leaves in the youth an emotional, intellectual and spiritual void that longs to be filled. In a home such as this, there is no meaningful family life. The parents have normally worked hard to establish their positions and want to enjoy the prerequisites of their status. They appreciate all they have because they have had to work for it. It is also possible that the parents grew up in a closer family system and that they may not possess the liberal university education of their children. Their concerns revolve around maintaining the status quo; they are conservative and for the most part would reject radicalism.

This is not the only home scenario. Another type of terrorist breeding ground is again found in the upper and middle classes.

These children are raised in permissive homes, are not taught self-restraint, and grow up with ideals, but find that their parents have generally made a compromise with the harsh realities of the world, cannot do much to further their ideals, and appeared to have betrayed them.²

In other words, their parents have compromised their ideals for money. To the liberally educated, idealistic and recently politicized youth, this betrayal of beliefs might be irreconcilable. The resulting confusion is at this time when the youth is most vulnerable to ideas of the left and radicalism. These are the youths that are looking for easy answers to extremely complex problems; and because of the inherent impatience of youth, they want solutions now! Terrorism as a means to achieve liberation, justice and a better way of life for the masses probably seems attractive to the now alienated young man or woman. It should be noted that men make up the vast majority of the terrorist ranks. There are women to be sure, Ulrike Meinhof not the least of these, but women normally work as support personnel in terrorist operations.

The permissiveness of the terrorist's parents, their lack of guidance and failure to take the time to explain the inconsistencies of life; in fact, a failure to provide their children with purposes for their lives and a structure for living it; all provide the vacuum into which the potential terrorist eventually falls. Adding to these difficulties at home are the anxieties brought on by society.

Post-industrial Western society is an extremely complex place in which to grow up. A number of problems given so much time by the press are nearly insoluble. Poverty is with us to stay. The possibility of nuclear war is constant. Even many of the troubles we can address have only partial answers. Youth have left religion in droves and now exist without moral structure in their lives unless some was provided in the home. This is true of both Italy and West Germany as well as most of the Western world.

The problem is one of credibility of Western institutions.

Politics, to many, particularly the young, has lost much of its allure as a means to change society itself. In Italy, many terrorists were those who rejected the compromising stance of the Italian communists and accepted terrorism only when they saw it as the only way to have effect. Political corruption is common in Italy and often given wide media coverage, bolstering the view that the system is dysfunctional, politicians are corrupt and the periodic reform programs that inevitably follow exposed corrupt officials really have little effect. Entering politics is seen as betrayal of the people under the present systems. The left terrorist groups seem to offer the only logical alternative to the alienated and educated youth that feel that they have no other means of worthwhile political expression except violence. These problems are compounded by psychological factors.

When the basic needs of an individual are satisfied, new needs become preeminent: the need for recognition, self-fulfillment and the feeling of belonging to something larger than himself. These feelings are largely unfulfilled for the alienated youth of the affluent, at least in the case of the young terrorist. An idealistic and politicized university student sees little to admire in corporate entities such as Fiat or Krupp. These companies are perceived as interested in making profit and certainly not correcting the inequities and injustices of life.

... the groups in question lack the following: a purpose in life; an explanation of the meaning of our world and of life; the ability to believe in something, to identify with something higher than their own persons, and to dedicate themselves to a higher ideal, to strive for more than the mere gratification of their material needs; the security derived from dedication to an ideal and from membership in a larger group; and the compa-

nionship and love of real family life.³

As a terrorist, all of the above needs can be satisfied. Not only is the terrorist recognized by his peer group, but by a world following his act of violence. Through this framework, he draws self-fulfillment and a feeling of belonging.

The discipline that has been

'The Guerrilla's Language is action,' . . . action included bank robbery, bombings, and murder; . . .

missing in his life until he joined a terrorist group is now provided in full measure. Obedience and absolute order are essential to any organization of this type. The young man who has lost respect for his country's political institutions, religion and his parents finds something noble and important in his struggle to overcome the structure of the society which he sees as oppressive. In this he also finds the justification for his actions. He sees himself as a hero, a freedom fighter and a potential leader of a future revolt.

They often see themselves as part of the greater world terrorist movement and thus have a feeling of solidarity with their terrorist brethren in other countries of the West and Third World. This romantic idea of world terrorist solidarity is a manifestation of how terrorists think. They feel the need to be a part of something outside themselves and to dedicate their lives to some noble purpose: something which the society they have rejected could not provide in their eyes.

With this understanding, it becomes clear that pragmatism sometimes be the antithesis of the dedicated Western terrorist.

His romanticized ideals often conflict with the harsh realities of the terrorist life style.

Another common characteristic of many terrorists of the West is low self-esteem. In this case, the terrorist's lack of esteem for himself finds relief in the effect he can have on his target population. The very fact that so many people fear him is extremely satisfying. This is his way of compensating for what he lacks.

The lust for power is and has been a major motivation for violence since the beginning of recorded history. It is likely that there are many in the terrorist ranks who desire power but are frustrated in their attempts to gain it in conventional ways. Terror is power to these people. They have the capacity to kill those whom they choose and the ability to spread their acts, if not always their names, over the front pages of newspapers worldwide. To them this is personal gratification of the highest order. Accounts of terrorists rushing out to buy newspapers in order to read about their exploits are not unheard of, particularly in West Germany. They often consider themselves underground celebrities and enjoy the notoriety.

In order to achieve the power they so greatly desire, they will form alliances with criminals, work with other unassociated terrorist groups, and kill anyone who stands in their way.

Finally, terrorism is exciting. For the bored, overindulged and alienated children of wealth, violence is the ultimate form of self-expression, freedom and self-indulgence. At least initially, acts of violence may be seen as fun. (It must be remembered that these youths are not well adjusted "average" persons. They suffer from a malaise brought on by the contradictions and confusion of their homes and societies.) Fun for some terrorists is the periodic psychological release they receive while involved in acts of destruc-

tion steeped in blood.

The aforementioned societal and psychological factors should not be considered separately but instead as a whole. Although a Western terrorist as an individual would probably not possess all the problems outlined, it is a fair certainty that he would have many. It is the combination of a number of these characteristics that leads to the eventual creation of a Western terrorist.

The Red Brigades

The Red Brigades terrorist movement in Italy is a left-oriented organization. They are Marxist-Leninist politically and, surprisingly, solidly against the Italian Communist Party (PCI). A study commissioned by the SCI claims that "there are 700 to 800 terrorists living in Italy's underground, and up to 10,000 persons who actively support terrorist activities."⁴ Since 1968, acts of violence perpetuated by the Red Brigades have been steadily on the climb.

It should be noted that statistics printed in the January 23, 1978, issue of **Time Magazine** state that Italy possesses 94 leftist terror organizations and 21 neo-fascist terror groups. This plethora of movements makes study of Italian terrorism extremely difficult. The choice of the Red Brigades as representative was due to its large size and because it is the best known group of its type in Italy.

Terrorism in Italy and in other industrialized societies is often explained as the product of psychological alienation resulting from rapid technological progress not accompanied by a simultaneous development in parallel social structures and accommodations.⁵

In Italy, the technological revolution resulted in population migration from the predominantly rural south to the industrial cities of the north. These cities were ill-equipped to handle the population

influx. Schools, housing, hospitals and sanitation services were pressed beyond their limits. The largely Centrist government which had engineered Italy's "economic miracle" of the 1950s and 1960s could not handle the resulting social problems contingent to progress. The university-inspired and student-led "Cultural Revolution" of 1968 was a

...the intellectuals of the far right will be joining a clusterful of jailed intellectuals who are responsible for the far-left terrorism.

challenge directed not only at the educational system but at the church, government and family as well. The structure through which Italians had traditionally lived their lives was regarded as antiquated and no longer of use by youth.

It is noteworthy that during the 1968 "Cultural Revolution," it was the schools where the humanities and social sciences were taught that provided the impetus to action. Universities that taught business, science and law were noticeably quiet. Although student protesters at the time were demanding school reforms, an end to the Vietnam War and the creation of a new society, the issue of jobs was seldom heard. The fact was, Italy had little use and even fewer jobs for those trained in the social sciences and humanities. This had to be a frustration for students in those fields of endeavor. This frustration could have led to terrorist violence for some.

This is so because of the crisis in state education, which represents one of the principal causes of intellectual unemployment; the dissatisfaction deriving

from the practical impossibility of making use of educational qualifications because of lack of demand is a reason for dangerous frustration, this is potentially disruptive. It is well-known how unemployment breeds an inborn stimulus, also irrational, toward violent behavior.⁶

The university was and still is an ideal setting for radical thinking in Italy. . . after the capture of Antonio Negri, a professor and prime supporter of the *Brigate Rosse*, Italy was shocked. A professor could not be involved in such dealings, many believed. However, after the Bologna bomb blast **The Economist** ran an article entitled "Dons of War" (September 6, 1980). It put the blame of terrorism upon the shoulders of academia, noting that. . . the intellectuals of the far right will be joining a clusterful of jailed intellectuals who are responsible for the far-left terrorism of the past few years, headed by Professor Negri. With teachers like these, Italy's young can hardly be blamed for flocking to the cause of Terrorism.⁷

The workers of Italy, up until 1969, had been both moderate and responsible. In that year strikes, union violence and demonstrations were constantly in the headlines. Union demands began to stretch Italy's economic structure to its limits. It is logical to assume that student unrest of the previous year had acted as a catalyst for working class unrest.

The PCI had abandoned its earlier, more radical views, and joined with the moderate Christian Democrats and Socialists in coalition at the local level of government. Accommodation and moderation were prevalent in the PCI's with the Christian Democrats. These two parties that had been enemies for decades, now attempted to seek accord. Many of Italy's politicized

and educated youth saw this PCI stand as an utter betrayal of the masses. These youths provided the fodder for the Red Brigades.

This terrorist organization was born in this era of government permissiveness, student unrest and labor strikes. Although it was the contradictions of Italian society which led to terrorism, it was the PCI which provided the intellectual framework for the Red Brigades' ideology. The hard-line Communist stance taken by the PCI in the 1950s was adopted by the Red Brigades. Secretary General Enrico Berlinguer of the PCI led his party to moderation and is considered a traitor by the terrorists. When the Red Brigades reference the PCI in their propaganda literature, they do not refer to "the PCI" but instead to "Berlinguer's Party."

This is demonstrative of the alienation felt by these youths. First they reject the government in power, then they reject the government's opposition. They see violence as the only logical door left open to them.

Given the mass migration of Italians from rural to urban areas, the city has become a symbol of the dysfunctional state. "It is just in the city and against the city that terrorists concentrate their attack."⁸ Not only are the targets of the Red Brigades most often in the city, but the urban environment provides security for the terrorists themselves. It is here where safe houses are designated, sympathizers abound and, most importantly, fear can be quickly spread.

To understand the Red Brigades' terrorists, it might be helpful to look at some of their ideology. The following passages are excerpts from their own propaganda.

Our commitment in the factories and the districts has been from the beginning that of organizing proletarian autonomy for the resistance against the counter-revolution

in progress and against the liquidation of revolutionary upsurges attempted by the opportunists and revisionists. Organizing resistance and constructing proletariat armed power are the directives that guided and guide our revolutionary work. What has all this to do with terrorism. . . ?

Urban guerrilla warfare plays a

Urban Guerrilla Warfare. . . works only so long as the state being fought adheres to some extent to democratic laws . . .

decisive role in the action of political disarticulation of the regime and the State. It hits the enemy directly and paves the way for the movement of resistance movement and the Autonomous area is constructed and articulated and not vice-versa. Enlarging this area means in the first place organizing the guerrilla war, its political capacity and fire power. . .

We believe that armed action is only the culminating moment of a vast political work by means of which the proletarian avant-garde and the movement of resistance is organized directly in respect of its real and immediate needs. In other words for the Red Brigades armed action in the highest point of a thorough class work: it is its prospect of power. . . ⁹

The above lines are crucial to understanding the Red Brigades. The romantic idea of a proletarian avant-garde, the reference to power, warfare and organization all tell of the unrealistic and unrealizable goals they have set for themselves. This is obviously a perverted off-shoot of Marxist-

Leninist theory, but could also possess an almost fanciful quality. How could they believe such writings as these? The answer to this question might be understood after considering what the Red Brigades have rejected. The government, society, family, church and accompanying structures of these institutions have all lost credibility with the terrorist. For the persons who feel this way, terrorism provides an opportunity to change all that they have rejected. If understanding their ideology can provide some insight into the Italian terrorists' minds, then an examination of one of their acts might also prove enlightening.

The kidnapping of Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades on March 16, 1978, was by far the single most headline-grabbing incident that they had ever staged. The choice of Moro as their target was perfect in their view. He was the leader of the Christian Democrats and a prominent moderate. Christian Democracy is another name for capitalism in the eyes of the Italian terrorists, and moderation leads to perpetuation of compromises and accommodation. In this context, compromise and accommodation mean the continuance of the status quo, and the status quo of what the terrorists hope to destroy.

The Red Brigades quickly put Moro on trial before a so-called people's tribunal and predictably, condemned him to death as an enemy of the proletariat, then demanded the release of 13 jailed terrorists as the price of his life.¹⁰

The mock trial was an attempt to legitimize the terrorist action. By going through the charade of a tribunal, they hoped to demonstrate to others the righteousness of their cause. The kidnapping of Moro as opposed to a simple execution in the streets riveted national and international attention on the drama for 54 days, something an

execution could not have hoped for.

In mid-April, when a terrorist hideout was raided and some incriminating documents were seized, no one was surprised to discover that Berlinguer (leader of the PCI) himself was the first choice of the kidnapers. He turned out to be too well protected to attack. . . ¹¹

The choice of Berlinguer as a target would also have been perfect. As probably the leading moderate Communist in Europe, Berlinguer was a symbol of the betrayal of socialist conscience to the Red Brigades.

The actual discovery (on 9 May 1978). . . of Moro's body, riddled with bullets, in a car abandoned in the middle of the city, at a point almost equidistant from the party headquarters of the Communists and the Christian Democrats, was an event that horrified the nation.¹²

The fact that the car was found midway between the two parties' headquarters was no coincidence. In this way, the terrorists demonstrated their utter contempt for both parties, and a possible warning toward the future.

The attacks of the Red Brigades have been primarily centered on the government and the government's representatives. It is no mistake that Giovanni Leone still lives. Leone was revealed as the most corrupt government official possible prior to Moro's death. A former president of Italy, he was forced to resign in view of the political corruption that surrounded him. More importantly to the terrorists, he was not punished. Leone is a living symbol of the corruption of Italian government. The view that the common man goes to jail for breaking the law and the rich man changes jobs is a pervasive view in Italy. The Red Brigades find propaganda value in men like Leone and

would probably wish them long life. As dead men, they become only history.

In Italy, the causes of terrorism are multiple: Western society's contradictions, the breakdown of the family, leftist professors who extol Marxism, the loss of credibility in the Western institutions of the church, government, and business, and the psychological

. . . for the Red Brigades armed action is the highest point of a thorough class work: it is the prospect of power. . .

factors contingent to the dilemma.

There is no ready solution for these problems; and therefore, no immediate solution to the terrorist problem in Italy. This is not to infer that the Red Brigades cannot be stopped. If the government is willing to institute repressive enough measures, terrorism can be halted. But the larger governmental, societal, and psychological problems which provided the impetus for terrorism in Italy continue.

The Baader-Meinhof Gang or Red Army Faction

Like the Italian Red Brigades, the Baader-Meinhof Gang (BMG) has its roots in the student unrest in 1968. It is a Marxist-Leninist organization; but unlike the Italian model, there is no cohesive ideological framework. Whereas the Red Brigades had developed their ideology from the PCI's hard line platform of the 1950s, there was no such example for the BMG. They had no ideological framework on which to build; and thus, they lacked the credibility of the Red Brigades.

The BMG, more so than the Red Brigades, can be better understood through its leaders. Due to its lack of codified ideals, the organization bears the personal characteristics of its creators.

Andreas Baader was an only child, raised by his mother, aunt, and grandmother. The boy became spoiled and was difficult to handle with all this feminine attention. He was brought up in a middle-class environment and attended private schools. He was bright and ". . . tended to be romantic."¹³ "At sixteen, Andreas was reading Sartre, Nietzsche, and Balzac."¹⁴ Although he was intelligent and possibly gifted, the structure of the classroom was too much for him. He would never finish his high school education.

Ello Michel, a painter who lived with her husband, became Baader's lover in 1964. Baader detested work and lived on a allowance given to him by Ello and part of his mother's social security checks. "He wore \$100 shoes, custom-made silk shirts with his monogram on the collar, and velvet suits. He was partial to rare perfumes, and in order to show off what he considered to be his wonderful buttocks, he never wore underpants."¹⁵

This man can only be described as a gigolo. For excitement, he stole cars and took up burglary. He would lie about his past to women he hoped to impress. He was described by people who knew him as vicious, spoiled, and manipulative. He apparently had a charismatic quality that allowed him to dominate women. This is one possible explanation for the great number of women who eventually joined the BMG. He was a heavy drinker and a brawler. His daughter, born of Ello, was treated with indifference. This is the man who would lead the Red Army Faction, as it would be called later, to acts of violence under the flag of political ter-

rorism. Psychologically, this individual possesses many of the characteristics outlined earlier in this work.

Ulrike Meinhof was the daughter of the Director of the Museum of Jena who died when she was a young girl. She was raised by her mother and Renate Riemeck, a prominent leftist professor. Under this tutelage, her political education started early. She had an exemplary academic record, and took degrees in Sociology and Philosophy. Her later marriage to a leftist publisher ended in divorce. She supported leftist ideals as the editor of *Konkret*; and as such, she became a well-known and celebrated socialist journalist of the 1960s.

After her divorce, she moved to West Berlin with her twin daughters and took up the cause of underprivileged children. She had lived the life of a distinctly upper middle-class individual, and yet she identified with the poor. " 'She knew she was a living lie,' said Renate Riemeck, 'cavorting with the rich and yearning to liberate the poor.' " ¹⁶

She was frustrated by writing. She longed to take a more active role, to have effect, and to change the society in which she lived. In May of 1970, she took that step when she helped Andreas Baader escape from prison.

By this time, Baader had become well-known for the April 2, 1968, bombing of two of Frankfurt's largest department stores with his lover Gudrun Ensslin. It was for this crime that he had been jailed.

Gudrun was raised the daughter of a Lutheran minister. She was extremely intelligent and attended Tübingen University where she studied Philosophy, English and German. She became a writer, acted in pornographic movies and eventually had a child out of wedlock. She later attended the Free University in West Berlin.

Although she was an early pacifist, her views changed radically when a fellow student was killed by police in the student unrest of that era (1968). " 'They'll kill us all' Gudrun shouted in one of her speeches. 'You know what kind of pigs we're up against. This is the Auschwitz generation we've got against us. You can't argue with the people who made

. . . She knew she was a living lie. . . cavorting with the rich and yearning to liberate the poor. . .

Auschwitz.' " ¹⁷

This is a reference to the past which amply demonstrates the sense of estrangement young Germans felt toward their past. They reject their past, the social order and pacifism. In a note found at her apartment, Gudrun justified the department store bombings. "We set fires in department stores so that you will stop buying. The compulsion to buy terrorizes you." ¹⁸

Her reference to the West German consumer economy seems to be at the heart of their personal motivation. It was not the government that was chosen as their first target, but a symbol the capitalist society. It is not just the overthrow of the government which they seek, but the collapse of society itself.

Through these three individuals, it may be possible to better understand the substance of German terrorism. They were certainly alienated from their society and fit the middle-class prototype outlined earlier. It seems that, like the Red Brigades, their goal was fanciful, unrealistic, and certainly romantic. "In Italy, the Red

Brigades formed as a reaction to the failure of Italian society, but in Germany the actions of the Baader-Meinhof Gang were directed at the very success of that society." ¹⁹

The grand coalition of the Social Democrats and the conservatives in 1966 within the German government may have given rise to the feeling that there was no longer a hope for change. The government in general was stoutly conservative. The youth of the 1968 student revolts would not accept gradualism.

The German university system also abetted the creation of terrorism. The number of students at universities more than doubled prior to the 1968 revolts. Vietnam, the bomb, and Marxism provided the confusing backdrop for the violence of radicalism. The feelings of impotence to affect radical social change provided the impetus to action.

Their sense of solidarity with Third World terrorist organizations was enhanced when Baader, Gudrun, and others received terrorist training from the PLO in Jordan. Carlos Marighela's book on *The Urban Guerrilla* provided further guidance in the "how" of terrorism. The longing of this group belong to something outside themselves was provided in this way.

" 'The Guerrilla's Language is action,' Baader had once said." ²⁰ The writings of his favorite author, Jean Paul Sartre, supported his view. The action included bank robbery, bombings, and murder; but unlike his brethren of the Red Brigades, Baader was quite content to spend the money stolen from the banks on himself. The contradictions of his acts never seemed to cause him or Gudrun to pause for reflection. He wanted to fully enjoy the fruits of the consumer economy that he was attempting to destroy. Baader was not a purist in the sense and certainly

no idealist. It is interesting to note that Gudrun was later apprehended by the police while shopping in a fashionable Hamburg boutique.

Due to the BMG's lack of an ideological framework, they bombed U.S. military installations, police headquarters, the wife of a federal judge and the Springer building in Hamburg. This piecemeal approach to targets created great consternation in the sympathies of radical-left supporters. "The Baader-Meinhof Gang lost all of its remaining sympathy and now found it practically impossible to obtain assistance of any kind."²¹ This was the beginning of the end. All the major members of the group were arrested within weeks. Baader was captured June 1, 1972.

Following years of incarceration, trial, hunger strikes and attempts by their free comrades to have them released, Ulrike Meinhof committed suicide May 8, 1976. Baader, Gudrun, and one other, Jan-Carl Raspe, took their own lives on October 18, 1977. Irmgard Moller attempted suicide at the same time but survived the attempt.

What had happened? This small group of supposed idealists were once the darlings of the chic and radical left in Germany. In fact, Meinhof was turned in by a former sympathizer. Certainly the cause lives on as recent bombings in Germany testify. To those who continue their struggle, Baader and Meinhof provide perverted martyrs to the cause. But what is the cause?

To Baader, the cause may have appeared to be the struggle itself. The spoiled, egotistical, and disenchanted boy never grew up. Excitement, the thirst for power, and self-indulgence characterized his life. His lack of concrete ideals probably led to his eventual demise.

Meinhof, carrying the cause of underprivileged children and the

radical left as her banners, was never able to effectively influence the group. She was the high idealist of the BMG, and it should be no surprise that she was the first to take her own life. At one time the most articulate spokesman of the left, she died in utter frustration and despair.

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Conclusion

The Western terrorists of Italy and Germany are far too complex to lump together in one category or categories. They are a product of our times, society, family, and the psychological factors contingent on them. The advent of the new technological age, mass migrations to the cities, permissive homes, liberal university educations, and the impotent feelings of youth all added fuel to the terrorist fire.

The difference between the BMG and the Red Brigades are substantial. The Italian terrorists fight against a government which is poorly run, where the distribution of wealth is skewed toward the top, where corruption is widespread, and where the powerful and wealthy are often not punished for their crimes. The BMG has no such clarion call. In Germany, there exists one of the highest standards of living in the world, the highest-paid workers, and an enormous middle class. Germany has continually funded massive social programs for the poor. In Germany, nobody starves.

The BMG must be understood differently. The German ter-

rorists, lacking the external reasons for violence, had to look internally. Their movement was more introverted and therefore less understood. Their acts of destruction sprang from frustration within: estrangement with the past, boredom, and impotence. It was a means to search for self-expression and a pretense for action. Their reasoning could not stand the harsh light of day. Even their sympathizers abandoned them in the end.

The following is an excerpt from an interview with Michael "Bommi" Baumann. He was called "Bommi" because of his proficiency at making bombs for the BMG.

BAUMANN: From our point of view Fascism in the West German Federal Republic had not been overcome; from our point of view it was growing again at the end of the 1960s. We did not want to look on helplessly as people did in 1933.

INTERVIEWER: Looking at it ten years later, was that analysis correct?

BAUMANN: It was wrong, at any rate so far as the timing was concerned. There's also something else we can see now. Urban guerrilla warfare as a form of struggle has collapsed all over the world. It works only so long as the state that is being fought adheres to some extent to democratic laws. . . .²²

Footnotes

1. Herbert A. Kampf, "On the Appeals of Extremism to the Youth of Affluent, Democratic Societies," **Terrorism: An International Journal**, Vol. 4, pp. 161-193, 1980.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Vittoriofranco S. Pisano, "A Survey of Terrorism of the Left in Italy: 1970-78," **Terrorism: An International Journal**, Vol. 4, Nos. 3-4, pp. 171-211, 1979.

5. Ibid.
6. Ernesto Fiorillo, "Terrorism in Italy: Analysis of a Problem," **Terrorism: An International Journal**, Vol. 2, Nos. 3-4, pp. 261-269, 1979.
7. Larry Edward Bloom, "Italian Terrorism: A Bibliographical Essay," unpublished bibliographical essay, American University, Washington, D.C., October 19, 1981, pp. 5-6.
8. Fiorillo, op. cit., pp. 261-269.
9. Percy Allum, "Political Terrorism in Italy," **Contemporary Review**, Vol. 233, pp. 75-82, August 1978.
10. William Murray, "Letter From Rome," **New Yorker**, Vol. 54, pp. 70-75, July 17, 1978.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Jon Bradshaw, "The Dream of Terror," **Esquire**, pp. 24-50, July 18, 1978.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Neil Curry, "The Mind of a German Terrorist," **Encounter**, Vol. 51, pp. 81-88, September 1978.
21. Bradshaw, op. cit., pp. 24-50.
22. Curry, op. cit. pp. 81-88.

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Mandate—(Continued from page 29)
killed by a terrorist.

Before any operation the terrorists engage in detailed intelligence gathering efforts of their own involving surveillance of their intended victim's routine activities. As soon as they have established a predictable pattern of behavior, they strike.

Under the direction of Levy, USAICS has been preparing to meet the needs of the MI specialist with a counterterrorist mission. Levy is writing a new Counterterrorism Intelligence Field Manual. Blocks of instruction have been designed to be taught to all students at all levels taking MOS training and professional development courses at the Intelligence School.

There is general agreement among those who have a firm grasp of this important subject that a prelude to war will be a well-orchestrated attack on major sources of power, communications routes, and national-level leaders throughout the United States. These attacks will be carried out by international terrorists believed to be already infiltrated into the United States. For instance, the screening of those Cubans who entered the U.S. during the recent Cuban flotilla episode, several individuals were identified as graduates of Camp Matanzas, the Cuban terror school. Subsequent escapes from detention centers have been professionally effected.

When one views the vulnerability of our open society to terrorist attack, and the prospect of our nation paralyzed before a single shot is fired, the importance of the MI counterterrorism mission is obvious.

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CORRECTION

The OPFOR article published in the Summer, 1982 issue of MI Magazine was, in fact, submitted as two separate articles. The first article, submitted by MSG Larry Hodge, should have ended with the paragraph just before the subheading, "BACKGROUND." The remainder of the article actually constituted the lead-off article for the OPFOR series, provided by the OPFOR Branch, USAICS.