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CEASE RESISTANCE - BE SAFE

To seek refuge safely, the bearer must strictly adhere to the following procedures.

1. Remove the magazine from your weapon.
2. Sling your weapon over your left shoulder, muzzle down.
3. Have both arms raised above your head.
4. Approach the Multi-National Forces' positions slowly, with the lead soldier holding this document above his head.
5. If you do this, you will not die.



PSYOP WARFARE

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By Maj. Robert B. Adolph Jr.

PSYOP: Gulf War Force Multiplier

In an era when our Army is getting smaller, it is time to start thinking about fighting smarter. There is no smarter way to fight than through the aggressive application of psychological operations (PSYOP) across the operational continuum. In peacetime engagement, conflict or war, PSYOP provides the commander with the edge he needs to win.

In fact, PSYOP should be viewed as any other weapons system in a commander's arsenal—a nonlethal, yet psychological casualty-producing weapons system that is an extraordinary force multiplier. The proof of these assertions can be found through an examination of the recent conflict in the Persian Gulf.

Nearly all the current evidence suggests that democracy will continue breaking new ground all over the globe. There are certainly a few throwbacks, but the tide appears to be turning in democracy's favor.

Still, all the battles are not yet won. Saddam Hussein continues his rule of Iraq; Peru still faces the constant threat of the Maoist insurgents *Sendero Luminoso*; the Philippines confront a stubborn communist insurgent movement; and Yugoslavia is in the throes of civil war.

Unfortunately, the battle for democracy will not be won with good intentions alone. And, to paraphrase Winston Churchill, only the dead have seen the end of war. There

will no doubt be more violence, yet there must be a means for getting the words of democracy to the many who yearn for it. Those words in turn must be backed by action.

At its root, PSYOP is the art of persuasion. This consideration makes PSYOP particularly important because deterrence continues to be the primary *raison d'être* of America's armed forces.

Achieving deterrence in the mind of a potential adversary is, essentially, a psychological operation conducted at the national level by our elected leadership.

It is unfortunate that PSYOP contains so many negative connotations. PSYOP is most effective when it tells the truth. Telling the truth is one of the pillars of American PSYOP and explains why it was so successful in the Gulf War—because the message it sent was credible.

U.S. PSYOP forces in the Gulf were able to pursue a multimedia approach to the conflict; media were used to full effect. According to an interim report to Congress by the Department of Defense, *Conduct of The Persian Gulf Conflict*, the PSYOP effort "was focused on breaking the Iraqi will to resist, and on increasing the fears of Iraqi soldiers, while pointing out that the Coalition was not opposed to the Iraqi people, but only to Iraq's national policy."

The best known of these efforts was, with-

out question, the dissemination of printed leaflets. The messages carried by these leaflets encouraged Iraqi soldiers to surrender to U.S. and coalition forces or to desert their equipment and units.

Thousands of Iraqi soldiers believed in the credibility of these leaflets and voted with their feet. According to Maj. Jack Summe, executive officer of the 8th PSYOP Battalion (Airborne) and PSYOP's Air Force liaison officer during Operations Desert Storm and Shield, campaign themes concentrated on "the futility of resistance; inevitability of defeat; surrender; desertion and defection; abandonment of equipment; and blaming the war on Saddam Hussein."

One Iraqi division commander was quoted as having said that the leaflets were a threat to Iraqi morale second only to aerial bombardment.

According to research conducted by the reserve components' 13th PSYOP Battalion (Enemy Prisoner of War) and based on a relatively small sampling, "98 percent of the Iraqi prisoners of war interviewed acknowledged having seen these leaflets; 88 percent of those prisoners believed the PSYOP message; and 70 percent confessed that the leaflets influenced their decision to defect or surrender."

Surrendering and defecting soldiers invariably had leaflets in their possession at the time they gave themselves up to U.S.

Psychological operations constitute a war-fighting function that can remove troops and units from the enemy's order of battle as effectively as bullets and bombs, but PSYOP is still short of resources and doctrinal recognition, despite Gulf War successes.



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All Photos from Cpl. Wallace L. Davis, 4th PSYOP Group

Surrendering Iraqi troops display safe conduct leaflets prominently so that their intent cannot be mistaken.

and coalition forces, despite standing Iraqi army orders that anyone caught with leaflets would be killed.

Leaflets were delivered to their intended audience by a variety of means. Air Force B-52 Stratofortresses, F-16 Fighting Falcons and Navy F/A-18 Hornets all delivered specially configured M-129E1 leaflet bombs. The Air Force's MC-130 Hercules proved to be a PSYOP work horse and delivered more leaflets by tailgate bundle than any other means.

One of the best known and successful PSYOP leaflet campaigns is described in the recently published book, *From Shield to Storm*, by James F. Dunnigan and Austin Bay.

... U.S. Army psyops specialists prepared and distributed by airdrop a leaflet with a picture of a B-52. The leaflet gave, in Arabic, the date and time the next wave of B-52s would "visit" the Iraqi troops in the target zone. The B-52s arrived as prophesied. Suddenly, the psyops leaflets had a newfound credibility and encouraged many Iraqis to surrender before, and after, the ground offensive began.

Some leaflets were even delivered by 155-mm howitzer leaflet artillery shells. Other leaflets were floated ashore in bottles off the Kuwaiti coast in support of a deception operation of the commander in chief, U.S. Central Command (CINCCENT) that helped convince the Iraqi leadership that an amphibious assault by the U.S. Marines was imminent.

The idea of using bottles was the brainchild of SFC Ronald Welch of the 8th PSYOP Battalion (Airborne).

We wanted to get leaflets into Kuwait, but we had to do it in a non-offensive way because of the deadline [President Bush's deadline to Saddam Hussein]. At that point they were still using diplomatic channels to prevent war. . . . anything that crossed the



border would have been seen as aggressive. But I thought a bottle washing up on the shore would not seem aggressive.

A smuggler from the United Arab Emirates delivered the bottles, and they washed up on the shores of Kuwait on 14 January—one day before President Bush's deadline for Iraqi withdrawal. This PSYOP helped to convince the Iraqis that a Marine Corps assault was still planned and, even by conservative estimates, helped to tie down at least two enemy divisions.

Another highly successful PSYOP-supported deception operation was the dissemination of leaflets overprinted with VII and XVIII Airborne Corps unit patches.

These leaflets were delivered in the millions along avenues of approach into Iraqi defensive positions where U.S. commanders wanted the Iraqis to believe VII Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps would attack. Coalition intelligence confirmed massive Iraqi troop movements in response.

In the words of Col. Jeff Jones, then a lieutenant colonel and the joint PSYOP task force commander, "CINCCENT ordered a halt to leaflet dissemination because the deception became too successful."

According to Col. Layton G. Dunbar, who commanded the 4th PSYOP Group during Operation Desert Storm, more than 29 million leaflets were distributed between 30 December, 1990, and 28 February, 1991.

Radio also proved to be a highly successful PSYOP medium. The 4th PSYOP Group broadcast "Voice of the Gulf" (VOG), which carried war news programming, Arabic music, regular surrender messages, promises of

food and water, assurances of good treatment and an emphasis on the theme of Arab brotherhood.

Based on a relatively small sampling, four of five prisoners of war interviewed heard those broadcasts. Those same prisoners considered VOG nearly as credible as the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and more credible than their own government's radio broadcasts.

The threat to Iraqi troop morale from VOG was considered so serious that many Iraqi commanders outlawed the possession of transistor radios for their soldiers.

VOG was broadcast from fixed stations on the ground in Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and from specially modified Air Force EC-130 aircraft from the Pennsylvania Air National Guard, known as *Volant Solo*.

Because *Volant Solo* is an airborne platform, it was able to broadcast over a wider area than conventional ground stations. Using its transmitters, there were few places in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO) where its signal could not be heard.

Loudspeaker operations were no less impressive. Serving primarily tactical commanders, active and reserve components loudspeaker teams were assigned throughout U.S. ground combat forces to provide tactical support for ground units and to persuade Iraqi soldiers to surrender.

Loudspeaker teams came from the active component's 9th and 6th PSYOP Battalions and the reserve components' 18th, 19th, 244th, 245th, and 362nd PSYOP Companies. In one case, according to the Defense Department's report to Congress, "an entire Iraqi battalion surrendered to a 1st Cavalry Division helicopter when the attached

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PSYOP loudspeaker team broadcast that 'death from above' was imminent." There were similar cases reported occurring in other sectors of the KTO.

Capt. Thomas Wright, who was attached to the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) as a PSYOP liaison officer, pulled together an *ad hoc* loudspeaker team three days before the start of the ground war in an attempt to "talk" an unknown number of Iraqi soldiers into surrendering. These Iraqis were holding ground critical to a planned 101st advance.

An entire infantry battalion ultimately surrendered, clearing the way for the 101st with no loss of lives on either side.

The 13th PSYOP Battalion (Enemy Prisoner of War) reported, "Several sources [Iraqi POWs] said loudspeaker appeals would have helped them to decide and effect the surrender of their unit."

Loudspeaker teams were also used successfully in support of tactical deception operations "to simulate the movement of heavy combat equipment in an effort to disclose enemy artillery positions to counter-battery and TAC air fire."

It worked, but I have been told by some of those PSYOP personnel who participated that they did not care much for the idea of being bait for Iraqi gunners.


An operational detachment from the 9th PSYOP Battalion was also attached to the 5th Special Forces Group. That group, designated an Army special operations task force (ARSOTF), along with its PSYOP assets, was later broken down and attached to Syrian, Egyptian and Kuwaiti ground combat units.

According to the PSYOP detachment commander, who requested anonymity:

Loudspeaker broadcasts were conducted along the Saudi/Kuwaiti border to Iraqi forward positions. These consisted of mounted broadcasts along the Saudi, Egyptian, Syrian and Kuwaiti sectors, and dismounted broadcasts forward of friendly positions. Several enemy prisoners of war were secured.

U.S. Army PSYOP Maj. Tabor Tritschler, attached to MARCENT's 5th Marine Amphibious Brigade, successfully directed a psychological operation over Faylaka Island in Kuwait Bay. According to Tritschler, marines were scheduled to conduct an amphibious assault and seize the island from an estimated battalion-sized Iraqi force on 28 February, 1991.

The assault was later canceled when Tritschler and PSYOP Sp. Jason Wells, with the aid of an interpreter, from a specially configured Marine helicopter mounted with a 2,700-watt loudspeaker system, were able to talk enemy forces into laying down their



Emblazoned with the Iraqi and Saudi national flags, this 'sunset'-design leaflet stressed Arab brotherhood between the two nations. The inscription on the reverse side (below) reads, 'In peace we will always remain hand in hand.'

weapons and surrendering en masse.

In addition, PSYOP-encouraged surrenders proved to be a bonanza in terms of the gathering of intelligence. Intelligence and PSYOP personnel were able to conduct hundreds of interviews with Iraqi prisoners and garner information of immediate tactical significance to commanders, well before the start of the ground war.

U.S. and coalition PSYOP were so successful that senior Iraqi commanders felt compelled to organize hasty "death squads," composed of Iraqi special forces units that were to hunt and execute deserting, defecting and surrendering Iraqi soldiers. This clearly demonstrates their belief in our PSYOP message.

Department of the Army civilians (DAC) also played key roles in the PSYOP's success.

The United States did not accomplish its Gulf War PSYOP missions alone. A great many coalition Arab officers and soldiers worked beside their U.S. PSYOP counterparts. Saudis, Egyptians and Kuwaitis provided the required in-depth linguistic and cultural expertise. Working together, coalition PSYOP personnel proved to be a very potent force.

At the end of active hostilities, PSYOP forces entered Kuwait in support of Task Force Freedom and conducted consolidation operations.

PSYOP personnel immediately engaged in supporting Army Forces, Central Command (ARCENT) civil affairs activities and the initial rebuilding of the Kuwaiti media infrastructure.

PSYOP activities included using radio, print and television to assist in locating Iraqi

soldiers in hiding and their weapons caches, mine awareness, food distribution and other public information programs.

PSYOP personnel also deployed in support of Operation Provide Comfort, assisting in the relief effort of the much repressed Kurdish population of northern Iraq.

There are other examples of PSYOP in the Gulf War worth examination—but from the enemy's perspective. U.S. Army PSYOP personnel know the importance of understanding the adversary's culture.

The Iraqis largely failed, and one Iraqi PSYOP resulted in a morale boost for our troops. "Baghdad Betty" transmitted propaganda broadcasts aimed at American soldiers.

In one memorable broadcast, she suggested to our troops that their wives and girlfriends were at home "sleeping" with the likes of movie star Tom Selleck and the television cartoon character Bart Simpson—a claim that reduced this Iraqi PSYOP to a laughingstock. This incident highlights the importance of thoroughly knowing the enemy before conducting such operations.

In fact, Saddam Hussein fought the war, largely, through psychological operations means.

Scud missiles were never considered a significant threat to the tactical formations of coalition forces.

The missiles are inaccurate, and unless carrying a nuclear or chemical payload, they are of little threat to maneuver units. Saddam compelled coalition forces to divert air assets during Desert Shield to Scud hunting by attacking Israel.

These Scud attacks captured media attention and were a psychological weapon: Sad-

dam intended to bring Israel into the conflict, thereby splitting the coalition. He was nearly successful.

According to U.S. Air Force Col. Frank L. Goldstein of the U.S. Special Operations Command's J9 Directorate, "Saddam Hussein leaned very heavily on the PSYOP experience of the North Vietnamese."

Saddam hoped that he could win the conflict by driving a political and psychological wedge between coalition forces through exploitation of the U.S. media. Since Saddam controlled what Cable News Network (CNN) reporter Peter Arnett was permitted to see in Iraq, Saddam attempted to orchestrate his propaganda messages through CNN.

A classic propaganda failure was the Iraqi-manipulated U.S. destruction of the "Baby Milk Factory." Naive peace activists in America and Europe "took the bait." Many of the activists retransmitted Saddam's message at their demonstrations against the war.

The Baby Milk Factory sign, obviously hurriedly manufactured in English for the benefit of the Western media, ultimately failed. The botched sign construction and overbearing Iraqi media control ultimately discredited Saddam's attempt to disprove the coalition forces' contention that only military and militarily significant facilities were being targeted in Iraq.

Saddam hoped that by parading shot-down and captured U.S. fliers through the Western media it would turn the tide of American opinion in his favor, as the North Vietnamese had done successfully more than 20 years ago.

He also hoped to convince the world that

the civilian hostages taken during Desert Shield were, in fact, "guests." Ultimately, these propaganda campaigns failed. Saddam Hussein was simply not believed.

Other Iraqi PSYOP included propaganda campaigns aimed at convincing coalition partners that Israeli pilots were flying U.S. aircraft, that Saddam would unleash hordes of terrorists aimed at the West, that American soldiers would die to save profits for the big oil companies, that coalition soldiers would be swimming in their own blood, and that Saddam represented the aspirations of the downtrodden Arab masses.

In many quarters, these campaigns were taken seriously at the time they were released, even if later discredited.

In many ways, we were lucky in the Gulf War. Saddam gave us ample opportunity to conduct PSYOP preparation of the battlefield.

According to Col. Jeff Jones, the first elements of the 4th PSYOP Group arrived in Saudi Arabia on 31 August. PSYOP staff planners deployed with some divisions from the United States or were subsequently dispatched from the 4th PSYOP Group when they arrived in country.

For the most part, these PSYOP staff planners and liaison officers had to start from scratch. Generally, the divisions and corps had done little or no PSYOP planning. In some cases PSYOP officers were assigned to G5 (civil-military affairs) sections.

According to Capt. Mark Vesser, who reported to the 82nd Airborne Division in

the desert in November 1991 as a PSYOP officer, "I worked through a G5 who had no previous experience in PSYOP, did not brief PSYOP at division command and staff meetings, and had no direct access to the division operations officer." Capt. Vesser should have been placed within the G3 (operations) section.

A similar circumstance was reported from the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) by Capt. Wright, who was also placed under the G5. According to Wright, the situation "was a result of XVIII Airborne Corps initially having their G5 control PSYOP." Although the corps corrected the problem, he explained, the 101st and 82nd did not.

Ignorance concerning PSYOP is still significant throughout our Army and sister services. Then, as now, there were no authorizations for PSYOP officers on division and corps G3 staffs.

In the next conflict, we may not be as fortunate as we were in Desert Storm. Many experts suggest that it is likely that future wars will be fought on a "come-as-you-are" basis, which would make it essential to place a full-time PSYOP staff planning officer in every division and corps.

We must practice in peace what we will do in war. The typical division or corps G3, in past years, knew little or nothing about the capabilities of PSYOP. Circumstances may be only marginally better today.

If tactical units expect effective PSYOP support, they must accomplish the necessary prior staff planning. That includes assigning PSYOP officers to operations staffs in peacetime. We cannot count on having sufficient time to train on the battlefield.

Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, is very clear on this subject, "PSYOP must be coordinated from theater to Division level ... The G3 is responsible for integrating psychological and combat operations."

Unfortunately, there is no one currently assigned full-time to perform this critical function. It is time for us to take our doctrine more seriously.


PSYOP does not belong in the G5; it is a G3 function. The application of PSYOP is a war-fighting skill.

Until we put an asset (a trained PSYOP officer) where our own doctrine tells us we should, the quality of PSYOP in support of future conflicts is questionable.

This can be done at relatively small cost to our Army. There are already a number of field grade officers serving at division and corps in the G3.

All that would be required is to recode one of those positions for a PSYOP officer. A division or corps commander in this way

This leaflet featured a B-52 disgorging a full bomb load and encouraged Iraqi troops manning frontline defenses in Kuwait to run for their lives. Dispersal was followed shortly by actual raids in the same area, so that the leaflets quickly acquired credibility, resulting in many surrenders and desertions.





Soldiers of the 4th PSYOP Group mount a 2,700-watt loudspeaker on a Marine UH-1 helicopter at King Khalid Military City, Saudi Arabia. A similarly equipped Huey persuaded an entire Iraqi battalion to surrender.

loses little and gains an officer who possesses a regional studies background, speaks one of the languages of that organization's primary contingency area, and knows how to plan for the use of PSYOP.

Of course, it is well-known that most field grade officers who work in G3 shops perform more than one function. It is to be expected that the PSYOP officer would also perform other operations-related jobs in addition to PSYOP.

A potential, but only partial solution, might exist within the special operations coordination elements (SOCOORD) that are now being fielded to our Army's corps.

The SOCOORD concept places a Special Forces lieutenant colonel and major, a Ranger captain and a Special Forces NCO in the corps G3. Recoding the major's position within the SOCOORD for a PSYOP officer could solve the problem of PSYOP staff planning in the corps, but would do nothing to help circumstances in the divisions.

According to the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School's Special Operations Coordination Handbook, SOCOORD "is not staffed or resourced to perform PSYOP functions and should not be considered adequate replacement for trained PSYOP personnel."

The conventional army has come to think of PSYOP as part of the special operations community, yet the SO community did not resource the SOCOORD to perform PSYOP staff planning functions.

In February 1992, Lt. Gen. Wayne A.

Downing, commanding general of the Army Special Operations Command, sent a message to senior commanders recommending PSYOP officers be placed on G3 staffs. It is too soon to discern whether or not this effort will be successful.

In addition, there is inadequate force structure and personnel in the active component's only PSYOP unit, the 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne). According to Col. Alfred Padlock, U.S. Army retired, a former commander of the 4th PSYOP, "It should be eminently clear . . . that one active duty PSYOP organization . . . is insufficient to support all unified commands."

The 1st PSYOP Battalion supports LANTCOM (U.S. Atlantic Command) and SOUTHCOM (U.S. Southern Command) in the Caribbean and Central and South America. The 6th PSYOP Battalion supports EUCOM (U.S. European Command), which includes both Europe and most of Africa.

The 8th PSYOP Battalion supports two regional CinCs, PACOM (U.S. Pacific Command) and CENTCOM (U.S. Central Command), with one small company each.

The PSYOP dissemination battalion contains all of the active component Army's radio, television and print media dissemination capability.

One unit, the 9th PSYOP Battalion, possesses all the loudspeaker teams currently available in the active component for support of America's entire ground combat force, including the Marine Corps.

Even in time of peace, the operational tempo of the 4th PSYOP Group is one of the most demanding in any of the services, in that it provides support to all levels of DoD, and to special operations forces and conventional forces.

In addition, there is a mismatch between active component and reserve components PSYOP forces. Seventy-five percent of PSYOP forces are in the reserve components, reflective of the Cold War era with its focus on Europe, and the mass mobilization of reserve components forces to face the now moribund Soviet threat. This mismatch underlines a serious weakness of the PSYOP community—the limited capability of its reserves to respond to low-intensity conflicts. Reserve components PSYOP personnel require the same in-depth regional familiarity and language qualification training as their active component counterparts in order to be fully capable.



Ground crews load leaflet bombs on Air Force F-16 fighter-bombers at Damman airfield, Saudi Arabia.

Surrendered Iraqi soldiers, some among the thousands who took a chance on the promises of allied surrender leaflets.



Unfortunately, they do not receive this essential education. Also, reserve forces are generally unavailable under circumstances other than war. The nature of future threats will likely require rapid and dedicated responses requiring expanded active component PSYOP forces that are trained and ready.

Although reserve components PSYOP forces have some well-qualified individuals, it is often because those soldiers joined their current units already in possession of language and regional expertise. This circumstance is not the norm.

Today, active component PSYOP forces (one group), are responsible for preparation for general war, support to special operations, meeting the demands of overt peacetime PSYOP missions, and ongoing support to U.S. efforts in foreign internal defense as well—all in support of worldwide contingencies.

America's only active component PSYOP organization is stretched to the limit. More force structure and fully trained personnel are required in the active component to accomplish the mission.

The majority of our Army's PSYOP officers are now stationed at Ft. Bragg, N.C.,

with the 4th PSYOP Group and the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.

Although a few senior PSYOP officers can be found in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, on the staff of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, in the Department of the Army Staff, within the J9 Directorate at the U.S. Special Operations Command, on the staffs of the combatant commanders in chief, and Joint Readiness Training Center, there are no active component PSYOP officers assigned in the G3 shops of our Army's divisions and corps to conduct PSYOP staff planning.

This is an error of significant importance. It is time we better aligned our personnel authorizations to match our doctrine, so

explicitly spelled out in FM 100-5.

The 4th PSYOP Group lacks adequate force structure and personnel manning to do the job, and there remains the mismatch between active and reserve components PSYOP forces.

Also, the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, to date, has only been able to fully train roughly half its active component PSYOP officer population.

Even with a full understanding of these past and current problems, coalition PSYOP managed to convince tens of thousands of Iraqi soldiers to surrender and broke the will of many more to resist.

According to the reserve components' 152nd Military Police Detachment (Prisoner of War Information Center), a total of 69,822 Iraqis surrendered or were captured by U.S. and coalition forces.

PSYOP proved to be an extremely valuable asset in support of deception and intelligence collection operations. Without question, lives were saved on both sides because of PSYOP's effectiveness. It is obviously important for us to win with the least possible cost in terms of lives on all sides of a conflict.

This point is all the more important if we consider that in five years, it is possible that there will be less than half the total numbers of soldiers, airmen, marines and sailors in uniform there were at the beginning of the Gulf War. With PSYOP, the commander gets more bang for the buck.

It is time for us to start thinking about how we can fight smarter. On future high-tech battlefields and in the low-intensity conflict environment, aggressive and expansive PSYOP provides the commander with a proven force multiplier.

This allied leaflet includes detailed instructions on how to surrender safely and stresses that those crossing the lines will be turned over to Arab forces in the coalition as soon as possible.

