


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
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European Security IN THE 21st CENTURY

An International Conference at *École Supérieure de Guerre*

Lieutenant Colonel James M. Dubik, US Army,
Lieutenant Colonel James W. Townsend, US Army,
Major Robert B. Adolph Jr., US Army, and
Major Charles K. Pickar, US Army

The dramatic changes of the last two years in Central and Eastern Europe and most recently in the Soviet Union have heightened the awareness among European nations that new and different security arrangements are needed. A recent conference hosted by the École Supérieure de Guerre in Paris provided a forum for interested parties to discuss the key issues. The authors were in attendance and report on this very constructive experience.

ONE COULD build a plausible case that modern collective security arrangements in Europe began with the Age of Napoleon. Then, the monarchies of Prussia, Russia, Austria-Hungary and Great Britain collectively sought to defeat the aggressive, revolutionary ideas that Napoleon and his army represented. Twice in the first half of the following century, the tables turned. A united, strong and aggressive Germany, with its allies, had become "the enemy," with France, Great Britain, later the United States and others collectively fighting against them.

The end of World War II, to use the words of Michael Howard's *The Lessons of History*, "did indeed bring to a close the era of the German *Griff nach der Weltmacht* which spanned the first half of the twentieth century." However, one must not view 1945 merely as the defeat of Germany. Rather, one should see it as the end of an era of European nationalist conflict, the latest version of which, according to Howard, featured Germany as "the inheritor of an aggressive impulse which has possessed each great European state in turn as each has attempted to consolidate its power." From this perspective, perhaps little has changed in Europe. Since 1945, the security of Europe had centered around organizing and preparing to defend against another aggressive Eu-

ropean state—the Soviet Union.

Thus, the end of the Cold War and the decline of the Soviet threat present Europeans with a particularly important and delicate problem. The nations of Europe must find a security arrangement that:

- Will not return to a balance of power system.
- Will preclude the resurgence of 19th century nationalism and the "aggressive impulse" that fueled past wars.
- Will suffice to counter residual Soviet military power.
- Will promote growth and prosperity in Europe.

Is this kind of security system possible? A recent international conference held in Paris, a conference conceived, organized and run by the student-officers of the 103d class of the *École Supérieure de Guerre*, admirably met this issue head-on. The conference did not intend to answer its central question—"What security for Europe at the dawn of the 21st century?" Instead, the purpose was to identify and discuss as many different issues the question evokes, from as many different perspectives as possible. To accomplish its purpose, the *École de Guerre* gathered more than 1,500 academicians, politicians,

The École de Guerre gathered more than 1,500 academicians, politicians, military officers, economists, religious leaders, members of the media and diplomats from over 17 nations and five continents. . . . The participants were very influential leaders, with several former heads of state, from Europe and around the world [who] conducted a candid and spirited discussion of the issues; theirs were truly "no holds barred" debates.

military officers, economists, religious leaders, members of the media and diplomats from over 17 nations and five continents. That such a conference was held at all is, in itself, significant. However, the authors of this article—as representatives of the US Army Command and General Staff College and the School of Advanced Military Studies—found that the true significance of the conference resulted from two other factors. First, the participants were very influential leaders, with several former heads of state, from Europe and around the world. Second, these participants conducted a candid and spirited discussion of the issues; theirs were truly "no holds barred" debates.

The conference opened with a discussion among a six-member panel. Each member spoke for a few minutes about how he or she would complete the following sentence: "When I hear the word security. . ." Predictably, each panel member's understanding of security differed from the others. Following the prepared remarks, the panel debated each other's answers. From this discussion, several issues arose.

The concept of security is changing. Security had been understood primarily in the military sense of one sovereign state or a group of sovereign states protecting their territory from the aggressive intent of some other state or states. Now, the concept is expanding to include a number of nonmilitary issues. Thus, much more will be expected of a future collective security arrangement than had been in the past.

One of the first changes discussed concerns the environment within which a security arrangement must succeed. This environment is

shifting from one based upon sovereign nation-states to one that must consider a more global, mass culture. This broadened culture is resulting from international media and tourism; global music and fashion; greater economic, industrial and fiscal interdependence among nations; and a multinational awareness of injustice, suffering and ecological responsibilities. Further, the military, political, economic, social and religious domains within each nation and among nations are overlapping more and more.

As if the number of changes is not enough, the rapidity and pace of change is increasing. Change brings fear and uncertainty; rapid change, unpredictability and injustice. And, as one speaker correctly pointed out, fear, uncertainty, unpredictability and injustice are the roots of war.

Any security arrangement that evolves in Europe must be one that will be successful in this kind of environment. It must be one that nurtures trust and respect among peoples and nations, for trust and respect are the human roots of peace and security. Unfortunately, as another speaker pointed out, this requires a security arrangement to predict and prepare for the unpredictable. Perhaps, he continued, this is too much to ask.

The session ended with the representative from Romania challenging, in a most moving way, one of the foundational principles of collective security—the principle of nonintervention. The Romanian's claim was that the principles of nonintervention, national sovereignty and national self-determination are subordinate to the moral duty of all peoples and nations to promote

Any security arrangement that evolves in Europe must be one that will be successful in this kind of environment. It must be one that nurtures trust and respect among peoples and nations, for trust and respect are the human roots of peace and security. Unfortunately, as another speaker pointed out, this requires a security arrangement to predict and prepare for the unpredictable. Perhaps, he continued, this is too much to ask.

and preserve freedom and human dignity. The peoples behind the former Iron Curtain, as well as some who remain within the Soviet Union still, were stifled by force, intimidation and totalitarianism. Furthermore, she continued, this degradation went on behind the protection of the principle of nonintervention. The legitimacy of this principle, she claimed, stops when humanity is concerned.

The stridency and moral purity of her remarks touched most conference participants. Her remarks brought to light the complexity, passion and immediacy of the issues that the conference organizers had bravely chosen to investigate and discuss in open forum. The remarks of the panel members set the stage for the rest of the conference. At the close of this initial panel discussion, one was aware of the obstacles and hazards that face European security in the 21st century, as well as the historic opportunities.

The opening session was followed by a speech by the French secretary of defense. He acknowledged that the future of European nations contained a significant amount of fear, uncertainty and unpredictability. However, he forcefully declared that this was exactly the situation a previous generation of European leaders faced at the end of World War II. Together, he reminded the conference participants, these leaders met the 1945 challenge. Therefore, he concluded, we have reason to hope for Europe's future.

With this mandate, the conference participants dispersed to one of six committees for discussions on more restrictive topics. Each of these sessions consisted of about 250 people in the audience, with four to nine panel members who

presented remarks, debated among themselves and responded to questions from the audience.

The discussions of committee issues reflected the heart of the conference organizers' attempt to create a forum for open debate of the issues from as many perspectives as reasonable. Thus, the committees' discussions resulted in findings, opinions and more questions—but not in any answers. While some participants may have been disappointed in not taking home answers, no one was disappointed in the discussion. Each committee's time was spent in talking through very complex and sensitive issues in a frank, open and lively way.

A New Europe?

The first issue concerned trying to describe accurately the new strategic situation arising in Europe and around the world and new strategies required by this situation. In general, the discussion revolved around whether the changes in Eastern Europe represented improvement or explosion; whether a new political order in Europe is evolving, should evolve or could evolve; and whether the problems in Europe-Muslim relations could be worked out so as to enhance the feelings of security and cooperative spirit.

The salient points of this discussion include:

- The changes occurring in the Soviet Union are fundamental and substantial, not transitory and superficial.
- The strategic situation in Europe still includes risks, especially in the areas of Central and Eastern Europe, European economics, ethnic problems and political uncertainty. Thus, a void of information exists with no one being

able to predict the future.

- The southern "threat" is difficult and risky; Muslims are split between fundamentalism and secularism; and French "interventionism" has created deep divisions with no easy or immediate answers available.

- NATO, with a US presence, will remain but with appropriate (yet unspecified) changes reflecting "new realities." (The implication of this finding seems to be that with reduced US military presence in Europe, some believe should come a corresponding reduction in US influence.)

- Turkey has chosen the West and wants to participate in Western political and economic arrangements and to follow Western values.

This discussion, like that conducted by each committee, raised a number of interesting questions, but reached no consensus concerning answers. Some of the more provocative questions are these:

How can the nations of Europe create a defensive system without threatening one another?

Will a migration of peoples from Eastern Europe occur; and if it does, how would it be managed without economic chaos?

Will the Soviet Union integrate itself into the world economic order even though it has little to offer beyond cheap labor and raw materials?

How will the individual nations of Europe balance their desire for economic prosperity and security, which suggests that they must unite in some way, with each nation's own national agenda and sovereign interests?

How does the United States fit into the European future? (Note: The question is not "if" the US should fit, but how.)

How should Europe react to the threats that Islamic fundamentalism, mass migration from Africa and the Middle East to Europe, inter-Arab wars and the Arab-Israeli conflict pose to European security?

Is discussing the southern threats creating a potential for a self-fulfilling prophecy?

Can Western materialism and democratic ways reconcile with Islamic spiritualism, at least sufficiently enough for peaceful coexistence?

European Collective Security

The second major issue directly addressed what sort of collective security system Europe might consider. This issue was subdivided into a discussion of three topics: the crisis of Europe's equilibrium caused by the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organization; the possible effects of the collapse on the current Western alliance system; and the desirability and feasibility of building a European military organization with new concepts and structures.

This discussion yielded spirited, sometimes emotional, debate. Some of the more interesting comments from that debate are these:

- A change in security arrangement in Europe is required and that it will take place is beyond doubt; what that change will be is the subject of much debate.

- NATO has three general possibilities: radical reform (a European pillar and transatlantic link within NATO); transformation (a "European only" NATO); or elimination and replacement by some other yet-to-be-identified arrangement, alliance or organization.

- New realities require changes in military doctrine and strategy—concerning both strategic and conventional forces—and entail a "funeral" for old principles.

- Multinational forces are possible and, over time and with proper care, may be the direction of the future.

- Nuclear policies should remain, for they are the required background for peace, stability and security.

- The political future of Europe must balance common action with individual sovereignty; this requirement will be tough to meet and will take time, realism and practice to work out.

- The heart of the matter concerning Europe's future is not in the changes that are taking place, but in the proper reaction to these changes.

Questions, again raised and discussed but not answered, include the following:

How can the different European forums for collective action—the Western European Union (WEU), NATO, Conference on Securi-

How does a nation control proliferation of advanced weapons technology without restricting legitimate technological transfers needed for economic development and competitiveness?

How can nations that appear to speak with two voices—one speaking of stemming weapon proliferation; the other, selling arms for hard currency or giving them away as part of its foreign aid program—be brought under control?

ty and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and others—complement each other? With respect to collective action and national sovereignty, one must identify both what one wants and what one does not want—both are important.

How do we proceed in this time of Soviet transition when it is unclear in which direction the Soviets may finally decide to go?

How does Europe reorganize—politically, economically and militarily—in light of changes in Central and Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and the reduction of US forces?


What is the proper role of a reunified Germany? And how should Europeans react to German reunification without arousing a “negative” German nationalism?

Does Europe need a “European nuclear policy” or should separate national policies remain?

What will happen when, or if, former Warsaw Pact nations are admitted to NATO?

Technology

Simultaneously with each of the other discussions, a committee debated matters of technology and space and their impact upon European security. Perhaps the most hotly discussed part of this issue concerns disarmament



and proliferation of weapons outside of Europe. The need for “transparency,” the problems of civil technologies and weapons development, the accelerated pace at which technology is developing and the cost of acquiring new technology—all provoked a fast-paced discussion, a

summary of which included:

- The Gulf War offered much information concerning the importance of technology in the security field.
 - Nuclear weapons technology is no longer difficult or “advanced technology”; thus, risk of proliferation is greater than in the past.
 - Advanced technology provides a nation another means to attain its political ends.
 - Control of some technology transfer is both impossible and undesirable; nations cannot conduct fast-paced business, industrial, financial and political affairs necessary to compete in the world market without advanced technology; to stop all advanced technology transfer is to commit national suicide.
 - The cost of advanced technology is high and continuing to rise; this, in turn, will give rise to a new category of “haves” and “have nots.”
- Two main questions arose in the discussion of technology: How does a nation control prolifer-

"The Conventional Forces Europe Agreement was a dramatic breakthrough; we must continue the momentum. We must continue to help democracies develop within Central and Eastern Europe within the interests of the United States, the Soviet Union and European nations. US and European security is interlocked. With respect to security, we ought to think in terms of cooperation, not confrontation." Brent Scowcroft

ation of advanced weapons technology without restricting legitimate technological transfers needed for economic development and competitiveness? How can nations that appear to speak with two voices—one speaking of stemming weapon proliferation; the other, selling arms for hard currency or giving them away as part of its foreign aid program—be brought under control?

Economy versus Security

Analyzing the changing relationship between economy and security was the fourth major issue discussed in the conference. Participants tried to come to grips with how to balance the necessity of domestic programs with military budgets and concerns about the environment. The discussion of this issue was not limited to the national, or even European, level. Rather, participants recognized the global aspects of the arms industry, economic competition and well-being, and environmental issues. In sum, the discussion resulted in these findings:

- The cost of security is rising exponentially.
- The pursuit of advanced technology is essential for a nation's economic future.
- Three possible approaches may help analysts: integration of economic information, data and analysis into intelligence data bases to reduce uncertainty and enhance predictability; use of insurance company models as the basis for determining acceptable risk; and use of equilibrium solutions instead of worst case analysis.
- The search for more efficiency in development and production of military equipment may result in arms manufacturers becoming more specialized; this will affect a nation's ability

to produce, by itself, all the arms it needs.

- There is much disagreement within and among nations concerning solutions to budgetary dilemmas.
- National budgets will continue to be the means by which governments identify their important programs and then put them into priority order.
- NATO will likely continue as the preeminent example of collective security as long as all member nations perceive an economic benefit from their participation.

In keeping with the conference goal, this debate produced more questions than answers. Some of the more thought-provoking are these:

Is the Gulf War useful for tactical and technological analysis, or is it an aberration that should not be taken as a model for future conflicts?

Should nations stretch their budgets and military organizations to prepare for such a conflict in the future?

Is it possible for the Soviets to develop a competitive economy and a more efficient budgetary process given their lack of free-market experience and their history of command economy?

Is a "peace dividend" a myth or reality? And, even if there is such a dividend, how far will it go toward helping to solve a nation's economic problems?

Do typical rules of supply and demand apply to arms industries and arms sales?

How will research and development continue in light of the multitude of possible threats?

What is the proper response to nations that speak of arms control then use arms sales as a way to develop international influence?

Our military forces are no longer a threat to NATO . . . to justify NATO military forces on the basis of internal strife in the Soviet Union is ludicrous. As a marshal of the Soviet Union, "I can assure you that there will be no coup in our country and this also applies to the hierarchy of the Soviet military. The changes that our country is undergoing would not be possible without the support of the military; we are committed to continued support." Sergey Akhromeyev

Human Factor

The students of the *École Supérieure de Guerre* did not forget the "human factor" of security. Discussions on recruiting, training, organizing, motivating and leading the armed forces of the future provided the conference attendees the opportunity to debate this very complex and important issue. The discussion tried to identify the nature of tomorrow's European soldier and the best way to organize, train and lead that soldier—within expected fiscal constraints. To that end, the discussion centered on the following ideas:

- Current and future military units must be filled by men and women who are active followers, not just those who passively follow orders; therefore, they must be given meaningful work.

- Many believe conscription is no longer a viable method for filling European armies; however, some ambiguity existed concerning when and how to replace it. Each nation will have to find its own solution.

- Leadership style and organization must account for cultural differences and the desires of individual nations.

Like each of the other discussions, this one identified important but unanswered questions. Unfortunately, because we were only four, we were unable to attend enough of this debate to record those questions.

Media and Public Opinion

The sixth topic of discussion was one that, given the Gulf War, was a hotbed. This topic concerned the role of the media and public opinion in matters of security—whether those matters occurred in peace or war. This debate, like the

others, held the participants' attention by its velocity and substance. Conference participants heard comments, then asked questions about what the media should and should not report during a crisis, whether there is a European consensus concerning collective security and whether Europeans would identify with an "entity" beyond their own nation. A summary of this spirited and hotly debated issue includes these observations:

- The trend in Europe is shifting from nationalism to collective security.

- Defense policy cannot be based solely on polls, for they are contradictory, highly subjective and multifaceted; yet one cannot ignore them either.

- In times of crisis, there is a tension between the view that journalists must have all the information, for it is the public's right to know, and the need to limit what information is made public, in order to protect soldiers.

- Information management in times of crisis is important in that it can fan or douse the "fire" of a crisis.

- More education is required of media reporters concerning defense matters so that they can produce more accurate reports and analyses; more is also required of military officers so that they can understand media's role and importance.

- No consensus currently exists as to whether a "European identity" has evolved sufficiently enough so that patriotism can shift from nation-focused to European-focused.

- Common values, as important as they are, are insufficient to produce "identity"; also re-

Europeans must act in a more united way before US leadership can recede. So many changes in so many areas as fast as they have taken place result in ambiguity. It will take time for individual nations and collective institutions to cope with this change and develop correct responses. Fast, radical change results in disorder and instability—this is the near-term risk facing both European nations and the United States.

quired are shared risks and dangers and common threats to bind people together.

- European public opinion can be divided into two segments: a transitory segment that arises within groups and is relative to a specific event and a permanent segment that is culturally linked.

- The media cannot approach war in the same way that they approach other events.

While the questions raised in this discussion are similar to those one might expect, they are no less provocative or interesting. Some of the more important are these:

How will the media profession balance the fact that information in a crisis can legitimately be considered a weapon with the journalistic "ethic" that requires "complete disclosure"?

Is there a role for manipulation of information in democratic nations, and if so, what is it? The purpose of a journalist is to report what he hears so that the public can make up its own mind—this requirement exists even in war; yet, in war is information really "neutral"?

How will journalists balance this purpose with the fact that, in some cases, information is as deadly as bombs?

Has Europe evolved to a state that it is a moral entity worth dying for?

Until it has, will national patriotism remain dominant?

How far will any one European nation go in divesting its national sovereignty to a transnational European unity?

What are the boundaries of Europe? Are Russia and Turkey European?

How will the Central European nations be

"reunited" into the European community?

The conference also included a very important teleconference and round-table discussion of the central theme: "What security for Europe at the dawn of the 21st century?" This was one of the highlights of the conference, for participating on the live panel were: Bronislaw Gembik, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Polish Diet; Helmut Schmidt, former chancellor of West Germany; Hubert Vedrine, special adviser to the president of France for strategic affairs; Manfred Wörner, secretary-general of NATO; and Vadim Zagladin, personal adviser to the president of the Soviet Union. Two more participants joined the round table via tele-screen: Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, military adviser to the president of the Soviet Union until his recent suicide following the unsuccessful coup d'état in the Soviet Union in August 1991, from Moscow, and Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser to the president of the United States, from Washington, D.C. At the completion of the round table, Pope John Paul II delivered a message, also via telescreen. Below is a summary of each participant's remarks.

Scowcroft: We must reconcile the need for Europeans to develop their own security system within the legitimate interests that the United States has in Europe's security. The principles of Helsinki and of arms control agreements must continue to guide our action. The Conventional Forces Europe Agreement was a dramatic breakthrough; we must continue the momentum. We must continue to help democracies develop within Central and Eastern Europe within the interests of the United States, the Soviet Union

The excitement in Europe is almost indescribable. It is . . . motivated by the possibilities that exist in a time of historic change; it is an excitement that acknowledges the dangers that accompany times of uncertainty. The desire for some kind of European union is apparent. The challenges confronting European leaders as they attempt to balance national and European considerations is also apparent. Time seems to be the necessary ingredient.

and European nations. US and European security is interlocked. With respect to security, we ought to think in terms of cooperation, not confrontation.

Wörner: We are in a period of uncertainty, ambiguity and danger. NATO is seeking ways to encourage change to democracy, freedom and self-determination, and to reduce instability, uncertainty and misunderstanding. Only by doing so will Europe have a solid base for the future. NATO must maintain the US link to Europe while:

- Transforming its strategy and military structure.
- Including Eastern and Central Europe and the Soviet Union—perhaps by way of the European Economic Community (EEC), WEU or CSCE.
- Strengthening the European pillar of NATO.

Zagladin: We should talk of security, not defense. The conceptual dimension of pan-Europeanism includes the United States, Canada and the Soviet Union. The current security instruments are:

- Conventional Forces Europe Agreement, now and in the future.
- NATO, even though its organization is changing, it is searching for a purpose.
- Some yet-to-be-defined European security organization. This future security organization is for Europe to determine, not the Soviet Union. Security cannot be limited to military security; we must expand our understanding to include social, economic, political and human security. There is no danger of war in Europe;

the dangers now are individual nations' domestic problems that should be left to them to solve. In the future, we should avoid destabilizing trends and do our best to build stabilizing ones.

Vedrine: Enormous changes in East-West relations and within Europe have been dealt with responsibly by all the leaders involved. In other times, such changes might have led to war. Everyone's aims are peace and security. We must retain this momentum by reducing both conventional and nuclear weapons. We must make the multiplicity of European organizations—EEC, NATO, CSCE and WEU—more compatible. The southern countries must participate in developing the future; the UN Security Council is the key and must be active in this regard. To gain true security, military forces are necessary, but not sufficient. Political, economic and social forces are also required and may be primary.

Gemerik: The current state of affairs in Europe and around the world is extraordinary. The "spirit" of democracy has escaped into Central Europe. The result is a more complex, more dangerous world. Security is linked to democratization of the world and international institutions. We should begin by transforming current security structures.

Schmidt: The next century will find a European union with a transatlantic tie, with or without NATO; and better relations with the Soviet Union; a better balance of military power; and reduced "fear" of German unification. It is necessary to expand the EEC to include new members. While we enjoy a better relationship with the Soviet Union now and look forward to this continuing, we cannot forget that the future of

the Soviet Union is not yet known. Therefore, a return to an adversarial relationship is possible, and NATO forces are still required. Economic and financial help to former Warsaw Pact nations is much more vital than military readiness in ensuring peace and security.

Akhromeyev: NATO and the UN are important for crisis management in the region and for global security. We must develop regional mechanisms to resolve crises before they become war. Our military forces are no longer a threat to NATO; therefore, to justify NATO military forces on the basis of internal strife in the Soviet Union is ludicrous. As a marshal of the Soviet Union, "I can assure you that there will be no coup in our country and this also applies to the hierarchy of the Soviet military. The changes that our country is undergoing would not be possible without the support of the military; we are committed to continued support."

Pope John Paul II: Peace among nations will happen when nations stop the need for war and resolve problems by other means. Security is based upon respect for human rights, freedom and fundamental human dignity. Solidarity, collective action, community—these are the foundations of security. To achieve peace requires a respect for law, a respect of individuals and an acknowledgment of the moral responsibility to develop and nurture these values in our institutions.

A very lively discussion followed these remarks. Some of the highlights of that discussion include these observations:

- The military reactions to the changes in Europe are the easiest to accomplish; the social, political, economic ones—these are much more difficult.
- The instability of Central Europe is the result of Soviet "care" of the past 40 years. The Soviet army still remains in Central Europe. However, return of Soviet soldiers to their homeland too quickly will be destabilizing in that there is not enough room for those who have already returned. The Soviet Union's transition to a market economy and new political institutions is hard enough; it would be even

harder to do in the face of a massive return by soldiers without adequate housing and sufficient job opportunities.

- A common European dollar is a symbol more than anything else, a symbol that the nations of Europe can work out differences and act in a unified way.

- Europeans must act in a more united way before US leadership can recede.

- So many changes in so many areas as fast as they have taken place result in ambiguity. It will take time for individual nations and collective institutions to cope with this change and develop correct responses. Fast, radical change results in disorder and instability—this is the near-term risk facing both European nations and the United States. Working together, we can "get through" this historic period.

The conference closed with a moving speech by President François Mitterrand of France. He praised the conference organizers for creating the forum to discuss such important topics. He then acknowledged that, confidence and trust being the foundations of security, such conferences themselves enhanced the security of Europe. Trust is the important key; as trust decreases, the potential for using military power increases—and vice versa.

The involvement of the United States in the past is the main reason we have had a peaceful Europe; US involvement in Europe—albeit under different circumstances—remains, and will always remain, a requirement.

We cannot miss the opportunity to develop structures necessary to resolve problems before they become reasons for war. Our task is to develop common approaches and common rules among the nations of Europe, the United States, and the rest of the nations of the world. These approaches and rules must be based upon respect for law and rights and make the United Nations essential for global conflict resolution. The conditions for a new international order exist, if we take advantage of them. The other nations of Europe, like France itself, will have to balance the responsibilities of national defense with those of collective defense.

The greatest and most pressing question remains: What direction will the Soviet Union take? For this reason, developments within the Soviet Union will remain strategically decisive for Europe, the United States and the world.



In Europe, an old order has disappeared. An order, yet to be determined, will emerge. The new order will be one of equality among all nations. The period of transition to this order of equality will be difficult and dangerous. To work through this period, we must reinforce what has worked and move toward new arrangements that work better, given the new strategic circumstances in which Europe finds itself.

One can see from the summary of the teleconference, a review of the issues debated and the questions surfacing from that debate, that the central theme of the conference—What security for Europe at the dawn of the 21st century?—is surrounded by complexity. But this complexity produced an excitement among the conference participants, an excitement created by the questions that were raised, the issues debated and positions challenged. Even formerly “taboo” subjects were topics of public, spirited discussion and

open, heated debate among the senior conference participants and invited attendees alike. This kind of frankness identified the conference as an important event in European history.

As the conference closed, we consolidated the multitude of impressions we had formed, opinions we had heard voiced, and debates we had witnessed into the following list:

- The excitement in Europe is almost indescribable. It is an excitement motivated by the possibilities that exist in a time of historic change; it is an excitement that acknowledges the dangers that accompany times of uncertainty.

- The desire for some kind of European union is apparent. The challenges confronting European leaders as they attempt to balance national and European considerations is also apparent. Time seems to be the necessary ingredient.

- Most European leaders acknowledge the requirement for a continuing transatlantic tie, whether that tie stays in the NATO forum or some other yet-to-develop organization.

- The United States has legitimate interests in the future of Europe. We fought two world wars there. Another war in Europe would also involve the United States. Most conference participants recognize this interest as legitimate; they want US presence in Europe. However, they also believe the strategic situation in Europe has changed; thus, the structure and form of US involvement should reflect that change.

- The future will hold economic competition, disagreements and tensions. However, we have an opportunity to build structures to resolve these problems short of war.

- The greatest and most pressing question remains: What direction will the Soviet Union take? For this reason, developments within the Soviet Union will remain strategically decisive for Europe, the United States and the world.

- Several conference speakers voiced their belief that one of the reasons the United States led a coalition against Iraq was to purge itself of the "Vietnam syndrome."

- One of the few themes common to all round-table discussions and committee debates centered on uncertainty and the need to take

advantage of the opportunities that change has presented.

- The conference was extremely useful as a forum for questions, discussion and debate, where civilian and military professionals presented and defended their views openly and vigorously. As such, it promoted trust and understanding.

- Europe is changing, moving ahead, acknowledging new strategic realities and trying to react properly to these realities. The United States, if it is to maintain its leadership role, must do likewise.

By calling for and executing this conference, the students of the *École de Guerre* seem to have realized that the post-Cold War era presents important challenges and opportunities to Europe. Certainly, developing a European collective security arrangement is a difficult and challenging task. It must be one that avoids a return to a balance of power system; precludes the resurgence of 19th century nationalism and the aggressive impulse that fueled past wars; suffices to counter residual Soviet military power; and promotes growth and prosperity in Europe. However, the 103d class of the *École de Guerre* demonstrated a willingness to do its part in meeting these challenges head-on and taking advantage of the opportunities. **MR**

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