

(FRG) and the Soviet Union. The book's purpose is to search for alternative strategies for the U.S. and the FRG in coming to grips with the true nature of their own relationship and their future association with the Soviet Union.

In the third chapter, Ole Holsti does an excellent job in relating public opinion research on the U.S. elite's views towards the Soviet Union. He clearly defines "elites" and then explains, in laymen terms, his methodology. His conclusions may be surprising to some. First, containing communism is not a dominant goal of the U.S. elite. Second, many of our elite believe that the U.S. and the Soviet Union have congruent goals and the Soviets often act defensively. Holsti also links ideological and political party preference to the elite's view of the Soviet Union. Though he admits his analysis of long-term trends is incomplete, a broad consensus of U.S. elite's views toward the Soviet Union is unlikely.

Only two articles attempt to come to grips with the Soviet view towards the U.S. and the FRG. The first of these articles, by Morton Schwartz, focuses on the broad problems President Gorbachev faces when confronting the United States. Mr. Schwartz does an excellent job in categorizing Gorbachev's past problems, but does not address the future. Wolfgang Pfeiler's article on Soviet perceptions of West Germany (FRG) is excellent. He begins with the Soviet's traditional mixed feeling towards Germany as not only the home of socialism but the home of Nazism. Through Russian eyes, Mr. Pfeiler works his way through the complex issues of FRG-U.S. interests, NATO and the future of German reunification.

Andrzej Korbonski contributes a good deal of original thought in his article on the German question from an Eastern European perspective. Focusing on the views of policy makers in Poland and

Czechoslovakia, Korbonski argues that the German Democratic Republic (GDR) is seen as a member in good standing of the Eastern Bloc, but some antagonisms still exist. The most obvious antagonism Korbonski sees is Polish and Czech jealousy towards the GDR because of Moscow's constant attention and the GDR's higher living standards.

The book's biggest problem is not in what it says, but what it does not say. Though the introduction mentions propaganda and disinformation, these important subjects are conspicuously absent. Additionally, the introduction implies there may be propaganda and disinformation about the Soviet Union generated from Western sources. This interesting premise is also ignored. At first glance the book may seem to be what Shakespeare meant when he authored "Much Ado About Nothing," but the book's good chapters are certainly worth reading.

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Shi'ism, Resistance, and Revolution, edited by Martin Kramer, Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1987, 324 pages, \$39.85.

The editor's preface to this volume states, "The aim of this book is twofold: to assess the present situation of mainstream (*Twelver*) *Shi'ism* in each part of this world and to measure the effects of Iran's revolution throughout it." The editor and contributing authors accomplish that goal, and more. In addition to Martin Kramer, the editor, the contributors include such academic luminaries as Bernard Lewis, the well-known and respected Middle East historian.

This book is a superb contribution on the subject of a branch of

Islam which has been in the shadows of Islamic study for far too long. With the rise of the Ayatollah Khomeini and the advent of the Iran-Iraq war, Western scholarship tended to focus on the effects of *Shi'ism* in the Middle East. But the book goes further than that and examines *Shi'ism* and its potential to provide a revolutionary impulse to peoples of that region, through Southwest Asia and into the Indian sub-continent.

A brief and understandable history of *Shi'ism* is provided in the introduction making this text useful reading for beginners and academics alike. The contributing authors explore the underlying causes of *Shi'i* unrest from both historical and contemporary perspectives. This provides the reader with a much better understanding of today's issues than can be found in the usual scholarly texts or mass media.

With the exception of Iran, *Shi'ism* is a minority religion. The authors agree that *Shi'ism's* minority status in the region of the Middle East belies its potential influence. One only has to view the spectacle of U.S. warships deployed in the Persian Gulf to understand, in small part, the impact of *Shi'ism* within the Iranian context and its subsequent impact on the West. *Shi'i* Islam will continue to have a dynamic influence on regional politics into the foreseeable future.

If you have an interest in this area of study, read this book. If you want to better understand the Iranian revolution, read this book. If you wish to know why Saudi Arabia fears Iran domestically as well as militarily, read this book. If you want to know what role the *Amal* play in Lebanon, read this book.

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intrigues of East Asian security issues this is not the book to read. Scan it briefly in the library if available, but do not buy the book.

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The Secret War Against Hitler by William Casey, Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1988, 304 pages, \$19.95.

The memoirs of the late Director of Central Intelligence, William Casey, who was often a controversial figure in the news media in the 1980's, have finally been published. Much of the credit for publication of his World War II Office of Strategic Services (OSS) experiences must go to his wife, Sophia.

The book, a project Casey worked at on and off over the years, but in earnest in the last year of his life, is one of the best books I've read about the OSS. It shows how General "Wild Bill" Donovan chose, developed and delegated authority to very young intelligence officers for conduct of the clandestine war against Hitler. Behind-the-line intelligence and sabotage operations in wartime Europe were definitely a young man's effort. At the age of 31, after various assignments, Casey was placed in charge of special intelligence — getting agent nets established within the boundaries of Nazi Germany.

In his opening chapter, Casey tells how the United States neglected having a trained intelligence corps. Casey cites the Army as having only a total of 80 intelligence people — officers, enlisted men and civilians — on intelligence duty in Washington and a handful of attaches at overseas missions at the outbreak of the war. And worse yet, there was no single focal point within the government to perform all-source analysis of raw intelligence infor-

mation to be processed into finished intelligence products.

Casey tells of arriving in wartime London at the OSS offices, of working with the British and the efforts to "set Europe ablaze." He also tells of the need for timely and accurate intelligence. Even in wartime, bureaucratic turf battles arose. Casey, among other informative insights, relates how these bureaucratic battles were resolved.

One particularly interesting chapter deals with the air targeting intelligence effort and how economic analysis was performed to help highlight which industries, if destroyed or damaged by Allied bombing campaigns, could bring German industrial might to a screeching halt. Sabotage and guerrilla interdiction targets were chosen on the basis of economic analysis.

The formation of "Jedburgh" teams to support Operation OVERLORD was also the focus of efforts at 70 Grosvenor Square where the OSS was headquartered in wartime London. The where and how of blocking reinforcements sent by Hitler was critical. Eisenhower was assembling the largest invasion force the world had ever seen, and to be defeated on the beaches of Normandy could have spelled disaster for the Allies. The Jedburgh teams were infiltrated into and worked effectively with French resistance groups to pinpoint German Army troop concentrations, dispositions and mobility capabilities for Allied bombing raids and strategic deception operations.

Casey also writes of the personalities of Donovan and Allen Dulles, the OSS Chief of Station in Berne, Switzerland. Donovan had the ability of working tirelessly and showing up wherever the action was taking place in the European Theater of Operations.

The highlight of the book is the chapter on training and dispatching agents into the heart of Nazi

Germany in 1945 to establish agent nets for collecting and reporting strategic and operational-level intelligence to support U.S. Army ground force commanders. Casey tells in detail how line-crossers, POWs and nationals of Nazi-occupied countries were recruited and inserted into the Nazi heartland.

Although Bill Casey died before he could write the final chapter of his book, his secret 18-page after-action report, "Final Report on SI Operations into Germany," declassified only in January of 1988, stands as testimony to how he felt about clandestine intelligence collection and sabotage operations. Perhaps it was because of his OSS background and his proclivity for being action-oriented, that President Reagan named Casey to head the CIA. The American intelligence community won't be the same without him. Casey's record stands as a legacy to his role in a vital and dynamic period of American intelligence history and should be read by every intelligence professional.

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East West Conflict: Elite Perceptions and Political Options edited by Michael D. Intriligator and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988, 210 pages, \$28.50.

In June of 1986, a group of scholars met in Bonn to discuss elite perceptions and political options as they relate to the East-West conflict. The results of that conference are published in this book edited by Michael D. Intriligator and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen. The book claims to examine the habits, labels, propaganda and disinformation in the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany