

ing had been shattered.

Today a united Vietnam has a standard of living roughly on a par with that of Haiti. Yet, as Colby points out, Vietnam had the potential of becoming the economic "fifth tiger" of Asia. Had matters turned out differently, we might well be hearing today congresspersons complaining bitterly of "unfair competition" from South Vietnamese VCRs or even compact cars. This sobering book is a basic resource for researchers, students and instructors interested in America's post-World War II Vietnam policy and execution.

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Joint Pub 1: Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces. By the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991. 79 pages.

The recommended distribution of *Joint Pub 1* includes "each officer in the rank of major or lieutenant commander and above in the U.S. Armed Forces, active and reserve ... (and) each sergeant major, master chief petty officer, and chief master sergeant in the U.S. Armed Forces, active and reserve," and for good reason. *Joint Pub 1* is the armed forces' capstone manual detailing the philosophy for the conduct of joint warfare by all the American military services. As such, it is an extremely important booklet. And, at a mere 79 pages, it is an easy read.

Joint Pub 1 has its roots in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. This act created a more powerful chairman of the Joint Chiefs and strengthened the roles and responsibilities of the combatant and unified commands. The booklet is organized into four short chapters which discuss American military power,

values in joint warfare, fundamentals in joint warfare and the conduct of joint campaigns. These chapters capture the essence of joint warfare by using historical examples and simple, straightforward language. This is not a publication just for strategists and operational warfighters — soldiers of all ranks can benefit from a better understanding of how we, as Americans, fight.

According to Gen. Colin Powell, in his letter at the beginning of the booklet, "When a team takes to the field, individual specialists come together to achieve a team win. All players try to do their very best



because every other player, the team, and the home town are counting on them to win."

It was not always thus within the American military establishment. Interservice rivalry was one of the crippling problems that eventually led to our withdrawal from Vietnam. And, as we have seen with our lopsided victory over the tyrant Saddam Hussein, joint warfare works.

In fact, Desert Shield was the litmus test for the Goldwater-Nichols Act and joint warfare. The act gave Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf complete authority over all American

forces within his theater. His strategy for defeating the Iraqis reflected that authority. He chose to pound the Iraqi military first with U.S. air power. Then he used the very credible threat of a Marine amphibious assault across the beaches of Kuwait in a masterful deception operation. Finally, he used his ground forces to perform an "end run" around Iraqi fortified positions in the western Iraqi desert.

Additionally, Schwarzkopf's skill as a joint commander prepared him well for the role of a coalition commander for the armies and air forces of many nations. Without the authority vested in Schwarzkopf by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the story in the Iraqi desert might have been much different.

The pub is full of pictures and maps that help illustrate points made in the text, and demonstrates that joint-warfare considerations have been important throughout the history of conflict. This is an important booklet. It is well worth your time to acquire it and read it thoroughly.

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Make for the Hills: Memories of Far Eastern Wars. By Sir Robert Thompson. Hamden, Conn.: The Shoe String Press, 1989. ISBN 0-85052-761-9. 218 pages. \$30.

Many consider Britain's Sir Robert Thompson the world's leading counterinsurgency expert. He earned his deserved reputation the old fashioned way — by doing it.

World War II experience in China and Burma and later in Malaya schooled him in small-unit operations, guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency planning. He eventually applied his knowledge advising the Thai, Vietnamese and U.S. governments.

Thompson's autobiographical sixth book, *Make for the Hills: Memories of Far Eastern Wars*, is not a

There is much to be investigated so that we may learn and apply knowledge when needed. This book will provide a good base for such an investigation.

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Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America's Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam.

By William Colby, with James McGargar. Chicago: Contemporary Books, Inc. 1989. ISBN: 0-8092-4509-4. 448 pages. \$22.95.

For once, here is a book whose title accurately foretells its content. The author, William Colby, was CIA station chief in Saigon, then chief of the agency's Far East Division in the 1960s, afterward deputy to the commander, Military Assistance Command-Vietnam, and, finally director of central intelligence until his retirement in 1976. If not "present at the creation," Colby was deeply involved in the pacification of the South Vietnamese countryside from almost the earliest days of the republic.

Colby's account is a contribution to what might currently be termed the "revisionist" interpretation of America's involvement in the Vietnamese wars: for all of its mistakes, the United States supported the right side and, with the government of South Vietnam, had succeeded more or less by 1970 in winning the "other war" in the countryside.

Certainly it was not pajama-clad South Vietnamese peasant guerrillas who broke down the gates to the Saigon presidential palace at the final debacle in 1975, but armored divisions sent south directly by Hanoi.

And finally, whatever havoc was wrought by America's supposed insensate destruction of South Vietnam's fragile economy, the people stayed close to the bones of their ancestors. Now a united Vietnam, supposedly free from the machina-

tions of the imperialists, has suffered a massive hemorrhage of the best of its population — the boat people.

Colby goes beyond even many of the revisionists, however, when he contends that the reviled President Ngo Dinh Diem was an effective leader, and that the American-approved coup that toppled and killed him was a disaster for the fledgling nation.

But Colby also feels that Nguyen Van Thieu, who eventually succeeded Diem, ably mobilized the Republic of Vietnam and cannot be held responsible for the war-weariness, misinformation and disinformation that led Congress virtually to cut off

sent the real war-winning potential of the U.S. effort. Certainly the evidence is coming in that seems to affirm Colby's thesis, as well as his contention that Tet was a disaster for the VC "worker and peasant" cadres.


But at the time, Walter Cronkite was telling U.S. TV audiences that the "bloody experience in Vietnam was to end in a stalemate" at best. In fact, this reviewer recalls distinctly at the time hearing another newscaster assert that Americans, who had always felt that they might not win the war in Vietnam, now had to face the possibility that they might actually lose it.

Yet in the wake of Tet, most of the countryside was gradually pacified, the government commitment to land reform was serious, and the administration of President Thieu, after standing for meticulously-examined free elections, had won at least acceptance from the population.

But, as the communists had fully anticipated, this war had now to be won on the U.S. home front. All of the shortcomings of the Thieu government were exaggerated in the more influential media, and its successes buried.

Colby gives a particularly vivid example of the climate in Washington in the early 1970s. President Nixon could invite President Thieu to visit him only at his San Clemente retreat; protests inside the Washington beltway at the meeting of these two "war criminals" would have probably have reached critical mass. More tangibly, U.S. aid dropped from \$2.8 billion in 1973 to a mere \$700 million the following year. The point was not lost on either Hanoi or Saigon. One year later, the Republic of Vietnam fell to a conventional armored blitzkrieg from the north.

It was indeed, as Colby puts it, a "double defeat." Not only was an ally whom the United States had pledged to defend defeated in a war of aggression, but the painstaking and successful work of nation-build-



aid to South Vietnam. At the same time, China and the Soviet Union vied with each other to supply North Vietnam, in blatant violation of the Paris accords.

Colby is critical of the conventional U.S. war effort in the South, arguing that it was almost irrelevant in the face of the war of massive insurgency, subversion and terror launched by the communists in the south.

For Colby, such programs as Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, or CORDS, and the Phoenix-program attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure repre-