

reminds us, he was "seen on NBC news as [a] Gulf War Expert." Summers' doctrinaire presentation, and, in particular, his summary dismissal of counterinsurgency strategy, will no doubt continue to influence military planners and doctrine developers for years — and perhaps exacerbate the unfortunate rift between conventional and special-operations forces.

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From Shield to Storm: High-Tech Weapons, Military Strategy, and Coalition Warfare in the Persian Gulf. By James F. Dunnigan and Austin Bay. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1992. ISBN: 0-688-11034-7. 512 pages. \$20.


James Dunnigan and Austin Bay have produced one the first of many books on Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield. From the outset, readers should understand that this effort is neither academic nor scholarly. Nothing is footnoted or referenced, and serious researchers will no doubt shy away from it. Even with that limitation, it is an enjoyable analysis of the steps leading up to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and subsequent events.

The volume is well-organized to provide the reader with an extraordinarily diverse range of information. This includes examinations and analyses of the Arab state system; Saddam Hussein's rationale for risking the invasion; an overview of United States interests; the role played by the United Nations; an account of the possible reasonings of coalition partners; and a historical review of events that led to the biggest global military event since the end of World War II.

The authors obviously did their homework. The data are well presented and reasonably accurate. Each Arab country involved is

examined in what Dunnigan and Bay call "data capsules." These provide readers unfamiliar with the Gulf region with enough information for a basic understanding of an extremely complicated area of the world. Middle East specialists will likely scoff at the hip-pocket analyses, yet, more often than not, the authors hit the mark. The work also contains concise explanations of the workings of prominent air and ground battlefield weapons used in the conflict.

Those who are looking for analyses of tactics and the operational



art should look elsewhere. Although the authors provide an overview of such things as the joint-warfare aspect of the war, there is insufficient depth to be especially useful. Maybe the best way to describe Dunnigan's and Bay's effort is by using the analogy of an enormous jigsaw puzzle. The authors attempt to provide as much information, political and military, as possible, with only the smallest amount of explanation concerning each piece of the puzzle. Although that sounds like criticism, surprisingly, the technique works. This reviewer's understanding of the events before, during, and after the Gulf War was improved because of their approach.

The authors make a number of

important points throughout the text. For instance, "The war in the Persian Gulf was the first war in American history that its armed forces were actually trained and prepared for." Dunnigan and Bay recognize that AirLand Battle doctrine worked because tenets of initiative, agility, depth and synchronization had been fully integrated into American military thinking, and that thinking paved the way for ultimate coalition success on the desert battlefield.

The authors provide lots of numbers — numbers of tanks, aircraft and aircraft sorties, ships and troops. Although the data may well be correct, it is a major weakness that Dunnigan and Bay chose not to tell us where their information came from. *From Shield to Storm* is written with a broad perspective, by the authors' own admission. Some of the chapters are transplanted, although reworked, from Dunnigan and Bay's other book, *A Quick and Dirty Guide to War*. It is clear that they capitalized on previous research to bring this book to press so quickly.

Frankly, despite its warts, *From Shield to Storm* is enjoyable reading. More volumes on the Gulf War will follow, and much of that work will be highly footnoted and laboriously academic, but for clarity and ease of reading, Dunnigan and Bay will be hard to beat.

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Special Forces at War: An Illustrated History, Southeast Asia 1957-1975. By Shelby Stanton. Charlottesville, Va.: Howell Press, 1990. ISBN 0-943231-28-0. 383 pages.

Do not be misled by the appearance of this book. Cover and format to the contrary, this is not another "coffee table" volume. The author is a combat veteran of Vietnam, with extensive archives of photos and