

quality of military forces and war-making power.


A brief review cannot do justice to the variety of information presented in this book. There is not a great deal of intensive analysis of any single conflict, but this cannot be seen as a weakness, since the intended purpose is to provide a useful amount of information about a number of "hot spots." The information is presented in an exceptionally straightforward manner.

Not all of the world's conflicts or potential conflicts are explored -- to do so would take a much larger volume. For example, the internal strife between Indians and Sikhs is addressed only briefly, and the tensions between India and Pakistan not at all. The book covers major flash points well, however, and provides objective and factual information in a convenient format. It will prove to be a useful reference tool as well as a popular circulating title in military, government and academic libraries.

No Greater Love: A Day with the Mobile Guerrilla Force in Vietnam. By James C. Donahue. Canton, Ohio: Daring Books, 1988. ISBN 0-938936-68-9. 272 pages. \$18.95.

Images of the war in Southeast Asia created by many of the books and movies which have appeared so far often concentrate on the same aspects of that conflict: mindless brutality, psychological trauma, unit infighting, drug abuse, political shortsightedness and strategic ineptness. There are many other stories as well, stories of a different nature which need to be heard. The passage of time has given enough distance to allow some of these stories to be told -- the personal experiences of ordinary Americans given a thankless task and doing it with honor. Donahue's book tells one such story.

No Greater Love provides a detailed recount of the events which occurred in one day on one mission -- Blackjack 34 -- of the mobile



guerrilla force.

The MGF was an outgrowth of the Special Forces-led Mike Force units, established in 1965 as reaction forces for SF camps under attack, for patrolling and for small-scale conventional combat operations.

The MGF concept was the idea of Col. Francis Kelly, then serving as 5th Special Forces Group commander. He elected to name its operations by his favorite radio call sign -- Blackjack.

The term mobile guerrilla force was actually a misnomer. The troops who made up the company-sized units were seldom indigenous to the areas where they operated, and the Special Forces personnel who led them served as platoon leaders or company commanders rather than partisan leaders.

The Blackjack operations achieved a measure of success in harassing Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army base camps and lines of communication using Ranger-type tactics. Blackjack operations were conducted from December 1966 until the formation of expanded Mobile Strike Force commands in May of 1968.

The operation Donahue describes led him, his fellow Special Forces soldiers and their Cambodian troops

into heavy contact with a large group of VC and NVA. Outnumbered and outgunned, they were surrounded on a banana-shaped hilltop until they were able to break out with the aid of close air support. As a medic, Donahue had his hands full coping with his own serious head wound and his wounded Cambodians and Americans. Beating off savage assaults, recovering mis-dropped ammunition resupply and bringing isolated elements of the company into the defensive perimeter are described with pulse-quickenning realism. Donahue's story portrays the American fighting man in a realistic manner -- not a hero, not some Rambo figure, but someone cold-bloodedly efficient in combat yet capable of feeling compassion for a seriously wounded enemy soldier encountered in a bomb crater. The respect and affection developed for fellow soldiers -- American and Cambodian -- is described in a straightforward manner. Many veterans, in fact, the majority of those who served in Southeast Asia, could tell similar stories. Those are the "war stories" that America may be finally ready to hear. Jim Donahue has done a wonderful job of telling this one.

All the above reviews were written by Fred Fuller, reference librarian for the Special Warfare Center and School's Marquat Memorial Library.

The Straw Giant. By Arthur T. Hadley. New York: Random House, 1986. ISBN 0-394-55181-8. 314 pages. \$19.95.

The Straw Giant is a thoughtful critique of America's Department of Defense and subordinate services, and Arthur Hadley makes a powerful case for reforming the hierarchy of the entire U.S. military establishment. Many of Hadley's ideas supported the congressionally legislated reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The author is not a career military officer. He does not hold a

liable covert-action capability, how that capability should be established and how it should be used.

Low-Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency and Antiterrorism in the Eighties. Edited by Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh. New York: Pantheon Books, 1988. ISBN 0-394-55579-1 (Paperback 0-394-74653-8). 250 pages. \$19.95 (Paperback \$8.95).

This book consists of nine essays contributed by authors representing groups such as the Christic Institute, the Center for Defense Information and the Institute for Policy Studies. That fact may make warning lights flash in the minds of some, since these organizations are sometimes perceived as being left-wing. But that should not interfere with a thoughtful reading of this book. It presents an excellent summary of the attitudes of a significant part of our society, regardless of how these attitudes are perceived among the special operations community.

The amount of research the writers of these essays have done is impressive, though some of the conclusions they draw are not equally impressive. These writers bring a number of significant questions into the public forum, seeking to focus

attention on subjects usually debated among the Administration, the State Department and the Department of Defense. There is nothing wrong with such a debate so long as the participating parties are reasonably well-informed and willing to discuss real issues rather than emotional extremes.


Unfortunately these writers seem determined to view U.S. involvement as the dark side of every issue. They feel the development of U.S. military capability at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict pre-sages increased interventionism into the affairs of Third World nations. Specific chapters on El Salvador, Nicaragua, the Philippines and Afghanistan relate arguments from this point of view, while the remaining chapters concern low-intensity warfare, counterinsurgency and "the new interventionism."

Certainly long and careful thought should be given before involving U.S. assets in any country. History is replete with examples which demonstrate what can happen when short-sighted policies take precedence.

Condemning those who are given the sometimes unwelcome task of carrying out current policy is not the answer to this problem, however. Public awareness of foreign-policy problems and the wide range of potential solutions is a laudable goal, though difficult to obtain. The authors of these essays have clearly stated their opinions on a set of critical questions in an effort to provoke public debate. This book should be widely read and discussed at all levels of government as well.

A Quick and Dirty Guide to War: Briefings on Present and Potential Wars. By James F. Dunnigan and Austin Bay. New York: William Morrow and Co., 1985. ISBN 0-688-04199-X. 415 pages. \$17.95.


The contents of this book belie its title. Dunnigan and Bay, who are military simulation experts (war gamers), have many years of expe-



rience in the study of war. Their insight into the causes and potential results of conflict in many of the world's trouble spots is evident.

Composed of a series of 15 briefings covering "all the world's conflicts, insurgencies and flash points," *A Quick and Dirty Guide to War* provides an interesting and highly informative background to many of today's headlines. A lengthy preface and a "How to Use This Book" section inform the reader of the authors' purpose and methodology. Each of the briefings that follow is composed of a series of complementary sections covering sources of conflict, history, geography, politics, strategy and goals of the conflict participants, superpower interest, and potential outcomes.

The final section consists of a statistical data bank covering current and potential wars. The first part of this data bank is arranged according to the participants in various conflicts, with specific information about the extent of conflict, danger to world peace, fighting power and superpower alignment of the combatants covered. The second part discusses the ability of the world's nations to wage war. The statistical section concludes with charts showing the top 15 nations in such areas as military spending,



doctoral degree in national security policy, and he has never served within the upper echelons of the defense establishment. Hadley writes from a different perspective. As a captain in World War II, the author saw action first-hand. He later attended Yale University, and upon graduation he began a distinguished writing career with *Newsweek Magazine*. From that time to the present, Hadley's special interest has been defense issues, and he covered both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts on the ground.

In his prologue, Hadley examines some of the reasons for America's failure in Desert One: interservice and intraservice rivalry, a deeply flawed command-and-control system, the misguided logic of creating a multiservice force which lacked unity of command, and too much security, which prevented those who needed to know from getting sufficient data to properly perform their missions. His points are well-made.

Hadley's indictment is not directed at the soldiers, airmen and sailors who risk their lives daily in the defense of this nation. Instead, he critiques from the top a military system which he feels is by its very organization doomed to failure.

The author credits six key faults with creating the majority of the problems currently found within the Department of Defense and its subordinate services. The first of these is the Great Divorce, or the separation of the military from the business, financial, intellectual and political elites of the nation. He makes the case that the services do not reflect a cross section of American society and that those who serve today represent, for the most part, the lower economic classes and minorities. This situation, Hadley feels, engenders both an elite population which has little or no military background upon which to judge military programs and a political leadership which reflects fewer and fewer individuals with military backgrounds.

Interservice and intraservice ri-

valry provide the author's second point of contention. He makes an excellent case that both interservice and intraservice rivalry are crippling to military cooperation. Theater commanders-in-chief command forces within their respective theaters, but services continue to control budgets. He explains how the services, until recently, sent all but their best officers to serve on the joint staff, thus sending the wrong signal to career-minded officers to avoid joint duty.

The author's third issue is what he considers to be the flawed organization of the Joint Chiefs. He condemns the joint staff's leadership-by-committee approach, which he says has failed in the past to identify critical faults in tactical plans because of the diffusion of responsibility. The multilayered bureaucracy of DoD and the JCS performs the daily chore of managing our military, he says, but fails miserably when tasked to perform missions where unity of command and effort are requisite conditions for a successful tactical outcome.

Readiness is the author's fourth target. Here he investigates the tooth-to-tail ratio of our armed forces and how congressional meddling, well-meaning or not, some-

times hurts the services' ability to perform their combat missions.

Hadley's fifth issue is overcontrol of the military. He uses the example of President Johnson personally selecting sites to be bombed during the Vietnam conflict as proof of outrageous overcontrol of what is clearly a wholly military mission. The author's point: such overcontrol hurts initiative and destroys confidence.


Lastly he examines the services' personnel management policies which ensure that the best officers will be found only in certain career-enhancing positions and that some very important jobs are being performed by marginal officers.

The book is not without faults, but the author's intent was to raise critical defense issues that are not easily dealt with by those within the services and our political leadership. Hadley's work is a deeply personal review of what one man feels is wrong with America's defense establishment. His analysis is often drawn on only a few examples, yet his assertions will touch a chord with the informed reader. Although readers may disagree with some of Hadley's opinions, his writing will make you think. This book is destined to become a classic and is must reading for military professionals.

*Maj. Robert B. Adolph Jr.
Fort Bragg, N.C.*



Book reviews from readers are welcome and should address subjects of interest to special operations forces. Reviews should be about 400-500 words long (approximately two double-spaced typewritten pages). Include your full name, rank, daytime phone number (preferably AUTOVON) and your mailing address. Send review to: Editor, Special Warfare, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.



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