

White's facts regarding Just Cause are just as biased and laced with errors, particularly concerning actions around Torrijos-Tocumen airport. It was, of course, Special Forces soldiers from the 7th SF Group, supported by AC-130s, who defended and denied the Pacora River bridge to the Panamanian Defense Force, not Task Force Pacific. Nor was "much of the fighting" at Torrijos airport conducted in the lounges as White records. It was the 82nd Airborne Division that liberated the Renancer prison near Gamboa, and 28 C-141s were absolutely *not* parachuted into the bogs surrounding the Panamanian airports (hopefully an editing error).

So if you, too, are tired of reading "definitive major works" that turn out to be laced with bogus information, do yourself a favor and skip this one. If you're interested in the British experience with special operations, consider borrowing it from your buddy when he gets back from the deployment. Since this appears to have been White's first book, maybe he would've been better advised to have taken a smaller bite and stayed with material with which he was presumably more familiar — British SOF and their experiences.


*Maj. John F. Mulholland
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War, Peace and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century. By Colin S. Gray. New York: Touchstone Books (Simon & Schuster), 1990. ISBN 0-671-60695-6; 0-671-74029-6 (paper); 442 pages. \$12.95.

Colin S. Gray, one of America's deans of diplomacy and strategy, has succeeded where others have failed. In a book which is destined to become a classic, Gray performs a masterful job in exploring and explaining why nations do what they do in modern times. By way of his comparisons and analyses, he highlights today's international events and projects them into a possible

American future. Through the use of historical analogy, the author draws parallels between modern nation-states and those of yesteryear. In so doing, he highlights cogent events and trends for further analysis and examination.

Be forewarned, this is not a book for those with only a passing interest in the arts of statecraft, war and diplomacy. If your depth of concern for international events begins and ends with CNN news or your daily newspaper, this book may not be for you. The issues that Gray examines are complex. His analyses go deep to the heart of issues seldom well-examined by the American media. In



other words, the book is not written for neophytes.

This book is of particular value to senior officers because it examines war, and the role of war, from a national perspective. Gray uses the writings of Clausewitz, Jomini, Luttwak, Mahan and other strategic thinkers as starting points for the comparison of differing historical American strategies in the international forum. This methodology works. Gray's effort seems to be aimed predominantly at graduate-level international-affairs students and policy makers.

Gray's approach to his subject reflects a more holistic, and therefore more easily comprehensible approach than this reviewer has seen used previously. Most scholars tend to specificity at the cost of overall understanding. Too much detail tends to obscure the larger, and often more important picture. Gray does not fall into this trap, and he is to be applauded for making this departure from the norm. By taking this approach to his subject, he is free to theorize concerning the interrelationships of culture, geography and strategy. What he says makes sense.

Although the entire book has value, Gray's chapters on technology and war, coalition warfighting and national security policy are particularly trenchant. America's recent conflict with Iraq, in coalition with other nation-states, and the advent of the emerging "New World Order," make his observations especially topical and interesting. Gray seems to validate the U.S. Army's emphasis on the care and training of its soldiers when he states that, "All of military history shows that superior military method applied by dedicated warriors is more important than technological advantage — all other factors being tolerably equal." From this perspective it is clear that technology was not our greatest advantage during the Gulf War. Our greatest asset continues to be well-trained and motivated soldiers.

This is a book that will not grow dusty on my bookshelf at home. I expect to be referring to it often for years to come.

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Special Warfare

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