

Peacekeeping is just one tool for containing or reducing conflict. Protecting human rights while rebuilding countries may describe future peacekeeping operations, but lessons learned are plentiful, and "as we cast about for models to use in coping with the conflict we see all around us, we can do worse than draw upon four decades of UN experience."

This book is a good primer for those who may become involved in future peace operations of any sort; it is essential reading for the serious student of the subject. We don't need to learn *all* the lessons the hard way.

The Tragedy Of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution Since 1945. By David P. Chandler. New Haven and London: Yale Univ. Press, 1991. 396 pages. \$17.00 (paper). **Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Adolph, Jr.,** Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C., who served in 1992-93 as a military observer assigned to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia.

From 1975 to 1979, perhaps a million Cambodians, one in eight, died at the hands of Democratic Kampuchea (DK). In addition, the DK outlawed the creation and possession of money, abolished private property, forbade the practice of religion, closed all formal educational institutions, emptied Cambodian cities, compelled urban Cambodians to wear peasant garb and work in the rice fields, and closed the doors of every independent newspaper in the country. In May 1975, a government spokesman proudly announced that "more than two thousand years of Cambodian history had ended." Moreover, the DK simultaneously demanded a doubling of rice production even while citizens were being "relocated" and "reeducated," cut off Cambodia from all Western technology, and purged the DK's own ranks of "counterrevolutionary forces" through systematic torture and execution.

As David Chandler points out in *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, perhaps 20,000 people were arrested without warrant, incarcerated at Tuol Sleng prison in Phnom Penh, interrogated, compelled to confess to crimes they had not committed, tortured, and executed. According to the book, there are only six documented cases of individuals surviving the horrors of Tuol Sleng. I toured Tuol Sleng a number of times while serving with the UN in Cambodia, and was always taken aback by the monstrously inhuman tortures perpetrated by the DK. The interrogation techniques included the use of hot tongs on the most sensitive portions of the human anatomy, poisonous and painful scorpion stings, drowning torture, beatings, food and water deprivation, electric shock, isolation, and more.

Chandler notes that the victims surprisingly were nearly all DK cadre caught in one of the many purges. It seems the most heinous crime that could be committed by cadre members was to disagree with Saloth Sar—aka Pol Pot—and his inner circle of enormously single-minded Marxist theoreticians: "The party was always correct." Fortunate were the cadre who were executed outright. Those unlucky enough to be locked-up in places like Tuol Sleng were often compelled to confess under torture to serving the DK's great imagined bugaboo, the US Central Intelligence Agency. Those named as co-conspirators also were rounded-up, interrogated, tortured, and killed.

Under Pol Pot's regime anyone who had an education, spoke a foreign language, wore glasses, possessed a technical skill, lived in a city, at one time traveled

outside Cambodia, or served as a soldier under former Cambodian leaders Prince Sihanouk or General Lon Nol was, by definition, a potential counterrevolutionary. The overwhelming majority of these individuals and their families either fled the country or died—by the hundreds of thousands—at the hands of the DK.

These are the facts, but what do they mean? Why did the DK pursue such disastrous policies? Chandler offers a plausible and intriguing explanation.

The DK was attempting to create the perfect utopian classless society in one fell swoop. To accomplish this, they concentrated their reeducation efforts on the young. Through a focused propaganda campaign, the DK convinced thousands of young men and women (mostly teenagers) that the only answer to the inequities of Cambodian life was to tear the entire fabric of their society apart and to start over from scratch.

These brainwashed youths became Pol Pot's executioners. At one of many killing fields just outside Phnom Penh, I visited a monument to the hundreds of thousands who were murdered. There a tall, hollow, concrete and glass-enclosed structure containing thousands of victims' skulls towers over mass graves which were excavated following the Vietnamese invasion. Most of the murdered were killed by having their temples bludgeoned with axes or shovels. Bullets weren't considered cost effective by the DK; crushing skulls was cheaper.

While the DK was in charge, the entire society was turned on its head. Cambodian Theravada Buddhist traditions revere the elderly. Under the clique of Pol Pot, children were often in charge and ruthless in their execution of their superior's orders. Unquestioning obedience was the only form of loyalty accepted by Pol Pot and his inner circle.

Many of the urban dwellers forced to emigrate to rural areas were not killed outright but died of starvation, dehydration, malaria, and a host of other diseases en route. The aged or infirm died quickly along the way, their carcasses left to bloat and rot along the roadside.

The DK's murderous paranoia is explainable through close examination of Pol Pot's inner circle. Having been engaged "for over twenty years . . . in a costly and discouraging struggle waged against what they believed was the whole weight of imperialism itself," they felt compelled to "inflict their utopian ideas on everyone else, at once." One of the inner circle, Khieu Samphan, stated that "those who stand in the path of the revolution will be crushed beneath it." These words can easily be interpreted as a license to kill, and so they were.

Chandler also suggests that perhaps another contributing factor to the genocide was the nature of Cambodian society itself. Cambodians largely believe in reincarnation and that the accumulation of merit in one's current life better one's standing in the next. This Hindu-derived, fatalistic belief system compels its adherents to honor, respect, and obey those in power, because those in power must have been very meritorious in their previous lives. Cambodians allowed themselves to be led to the slaughter never suspecting that "the meritorious" were capable of such horrors.

Much of what occurred in Cambodia appears to be a horrifyingly twisted amalgam of such literary works as *1984*, *Lord Of The Flies*, and *Brave New World*. Elements of each are apparent. Mind control, the exploitation of youth, incredible ruthlessness and brutality, and the doctrinaire application of unproven theory are present. The synthesis of these elements led to mass murder on a scale not seen since World War II.

David Chandler has obviously conducted painstaking research and remains as objective as possible throughout his text. Chandler's style of writing is relatively simple and straightforward, unlike the work of many academics. His chapters are well organized, and he blends details and generalities in such a way that it genuinely aids in comprehension. Overall, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History* is, and I expect will remain, the best contemporary history on Cambodia available in the English language.

International Peacekeeping. By Paul F. Diehl. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1993. 211 Pages. \$36.50. **Reviewed by Colonel Karl Farris**, Director, US Army Peacekeeping Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

Policymakers in the United Nations and the United States would be well advised to read and ponder the findings of Paul F. Diehl's monograph *International Peacekeeping*. The author's stated purpose is to "fill some of the theoretical and policy gaps that exist in our understanding of international peacekeeping operations." He then identifies empirical generalizations about peacekeeping to permit development of some relevant policy guidelines for such operations in the future.

Using case studies of six "traditional" UN peacekeeping operations, he seeks to isolate and analyze conditions under which peacekeeping operations can be successful. Diehl defines the ideal peacekeeping operation as one that prevents or deters fighting during its development and subsequently leads the disputants to an agreement. With the latter achievement, the "interposition" (peacekeeping) force can be withdrawn because it is no longer needed. Diehl defines success for a peacekeeping operation as (1) maintaining cease-fire arrangements and (2) promoting resolution of the underlying conflict between protagonists. Both seem to be reasonable criteria.

Diehl begins with a short historical background to international peacekeeping, then introduces the six case studies. Chronologically, by date of establishment, these are: UN Emergency Force I in the Middle East (UNEF I); UN Operations in the Congo (UNOC); UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP); UN Emergency Force II in the Middle East (UNEF II); UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL); and an operation not controlled by the UN, the Multi-National Force (MNF) deployed to Beirut, Lebanon.

The author's conclusions will not be heartening to proponents of using multinational peacekeeping forces in response to almost every conflict in the world. Only UNEF II is judged as being even somewhat successful in limiting armed conflict (success criterion 1) and then contributing to conflict resolution between the warring parties (success criterion 2). Analysis of the other five operations shows that the peacekeepers either withdrew in the face of defeat or that the operations persist today as "testaments to the unresolved hostility in the region." The author's analysis suggests that peacekeeping operations have been largely ineffective.

Among the policy guidelines Diehl deduces from the case studies:

- Peacekeeping is better suited to interstate border or territorial disputes than to nationalist struggles, where the outlook for success is very unpromising.
- To have a chance of success, peacekeeping operations must have the support of the primary actors. Mere acquiescence is not enough.
- If peacekeepers are deployed in civil conflicts, subnational actors—local militias, rebel groups—must be supportive of the peacekeeping force.