

Book Reviews

Special Warfare

You Can't Fight Tanks With Bayonets: Psychological Warfare Against the Japanese Army in the Southwest Pacific. By Allison B. Gilmore. Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1998. ISBN: 0-8032-2167-3. 226 pages. \$45.

Allison Gilmore has written the best book to date on psychological operations in the southwest Pacific during World War II. What makes her volume better? It is readable and chock-full of meaningful and well-researched data and interesting stories concerning PSYOP in its infancy.

As a former PSYOP officer, this reviewer was consistently surprised to find that PSYOP practitioners during World War II faced some of the same problems that their counterparts face today: lack of credibility (in the early war); the initial reluctance of aircrews to fly PSYOP missions; difficulty in finding the right people for critically important missions; a shortage of qualified linguists; and difficulty in dealing successfully with their coalition partners (the Australians).

Gilmore writes with authority and clarity, and she has done her homework. Although her book is not exhaustive, it is thoroughly academic and contains useful end notes. It is an excellent source book for researchers.

Gilmore tells why many Japanese soldiers chose death before the dishonor of surrender and why others, clutching PSYOP-produced and PSYOP-disseminated surrender leaflets, chose not only to surrender, but also to cooperate fully



with American and Australian intelligence officers.

The author explains why PSYOP was so unexpectedly successful in the southwest Pacific theater: Particularly near the end of the war, the Japanese high command began lying to its soldiers about Japanese tactical and operational losses. Disheartened, Japanese soldiers turned to PSYOP-produced leaflets for the truth about the war. Before long, Japanese soldiers came to trust the U.S. PSYOP leaflets more than they trusted their chain of command. Leaflets were commonly found on the bodies of slain or surrendering Japanese soldiers, even though possession of the leaflets was tantamount to treason in the Japanese army and was punishable by death.

As a result of the effective PSYOP campaigns, the U.S. gained a regular flow of intelli-

gence from surrendering Japanese soldiers, and the information proved to be a bonanza for operational commanders. Because Japanese soldiers were expected to die in the conduct of their duty, they were not taught how to conduct themselves if captured.

Because of Japanese cultural indoctrination, the soldiers who did surrender felt that they could never return home to face the shame of surviving. Those prisoners therefore felt free to "join" Allied forces and to cooperate fully. Many captured soldiers were so anxious to please their American and Australian interrogators that they volunteered tactical information. Eighty-eight percent of Japanese prisoners expressed no desire to return home after the war.

Gilmore discusses other successful PSYOP themes in the southwest Pacific theater, including those now well-understood themes that directly address the concerns of the soldier and his place on the front lines. It has been proven time and again that themes using grand, patriotic generalizations ultimately impress few combat-hardened veterans.

Gilmore's book reminds us that everything old is new again; that the most effective PSYOP tells the truth; that PSYOP must be practiced in peacetime in order to be effective in conflict; that culturally sensitive and linguistically competent PSYOP personnel cannot be created overnight; and that, unfortunately, commanders at all levels seemingly gain a genuine appreciation for PSYOP only

structures of theater SOCs, joint intelligence centers, and higher-level agencies, as well as their connectivity with ARSOF operational units. The final draft of FM 3-05.102 is scheduled to be staffed to field SOF units during the spring of 2001. The project officer is Captain R. Keith McClung; DSN 239-5393/8689; e-mail: mcclungr@soc.mil.

FM 3-05.103 (63-31), *ARSOF Combat Service Support*, is a revision and an expansion of FM 63-24, *Special Operations Support Battalion*, dated 1995. FM 3-05.103 (63-31) will provide users with a base document for determining future doctrine and procedures for combat-service support, or CSS. It will address ARSOF CSS structure, capabilities and support requirements. FM 3-05.103 (63-31) will offer guidance on operational planning and on educating personnel; and it will include the structure of both the Special Operations Support Command and the Special Operations Support Battalion. The initial draft is scheduled to be staffed to SOF units in July 2001. The project officer is Captain Nadine Lief; DSN 239-5393/8689; e-mail: liefn@soc.mil.

FM 3-05.106, *ARSOF Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*, is a new publication still under development. It will provide a basic reference for planning and conducting ARSOF noncombatant evacuation operations, or NEO. The manual will outline the capabilities and organization of Special Forces, Ranger, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and support units in the conduct of NEO in joint, multinational and interagency environments. The project officer is Major Alexander Fletcher; DSN 239-5393/8689; e-mail: fletchea@soc.mil.

FM 3-05.232, *Special Forces Group Intelligence Operations*, is another new publication that is being developed. It will describe the capabilities of the SF group's intelligence organization and the techniques that organization uses to support the missions of SF teams. It will also explain the

management of the intelligence cycle and the intelligence-communications architecture of the SF community. The project officer is Captain R. Keith McClung; DSN 239-5393/8689; e-mail: mcclungr@soc.mil.

ST 31-184, *U.S. Army Special Forces Forward Operational Base Field Standing Operating Procedures*, dated 1976, is being revised. The special text will serve as a basis for establishing and operating an SF battalion forward operational base. ST 31-184 is intended to be used in conjunction with FM 3-05.20 (31-20), *Special Forces Operations*. The final draft was staffed to field ARSOF units for comments in January 2001. The project officer is Ed Sayre; DSN 239-8689/5255; e-mail: sayree@soc.mil.

Drafts of the publications will be posted on the DOTD web site (<https://asociweb.soc.mil/swcs/dotd/DOTDpage.htm>), and they will also be available through TRADOC's Automated Systems Approach to Training.

SWCS revising PSYOP TTP manual

The SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine's Psychological Operations Division is revising the manual that describes basic PSYOP tactics, techniques and procedures for implementing U.S. Army PSYOP doctrine.

Army Field Manual 3-05.301 (FM 33-1-1), *Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*, explains the fundamental principles by which PSYOP decision-makers and forces perform their actions in support of U.S. national objectives worldwide.

Essentially, the manual is a comprehensive, step-by-step "how to" publication that focuses on critical PSYOP tasks, duties and responsibilities. The revised manual will give PSYOP soldiers information and analyses that they can use in conducting effective PSYOP across the entire conflict spectrum.

The timeliness of the revised

manual is critical. The pervasive and fluid media environment presents complex challenges as the demand for PSYOP accelerates. The manual is unique in that it presents operational guidelines based not only on recent challenges the Army has faced, but also on advances within the highly technical, global information arena.

A new videotape, *Introduction to the POTF and the PSYOP Development Process*, introduces viewers to the PSYOP development process. The tape will serve as interim doctrine until FM 3-05.301, (FM 33-1-1) is published. Units can obtain the tape (production number 711195) at no charge through the Defense Visual Information web site (dodimagery.afis.osd.mil).

SWCS to conduct ARSOF writing-awards program

The Special Warfare Center and School will conduct a writing-awards program to promote quality writing that supports the professional development of Army special-operations forces.

The theme for the 2001 ARSOF Writing Awards Program will be "ARSOF and Peacekeeping." Topics may include national-defense policy; tactics and strategy; education and training; weapons; communications and equipment; logistics; task-force organization and doctrine; leadership; foreign military forces; or history.

Submissions must be original, type-written compositions of not more than 5,000 words. Awards will be given in three categories: officer, senior NCO, and E6 and below. Winning essays will be published in *Special Warfare*. Deadline for submissions is July 17, 2001.

For details, telephone the SWCS Directorate of History, Archives, Library and Museum at DSN 236-3911 or commercial (910) 396-3911.



when it is demonstrated.

You Can't Fight Tanks With Bayonets is recommended reading for anyone who has an interest in psychological operations.

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Military Geography for Professionals and the Public. By John M. Collins. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1998. ISBN: 1-57906-002-1 (paperback). 461 pages. \$39.

The very word "geography" intimidates some people, particularly those who grew up in an era when geography was a required subject during the last two years of grammar school and was usually taught by a demanding, no-nonsense teacher. John Collins has so ably addressed the subject in a military context that even the members of mature generations who have painful memories of geography will enjoy his book and learn from it. Those of more recent education, many of whom missed the joys, pains and scars of this once-obligatory subject, should find the book a delightful way to fill an educational gap and to expand their professional knowledge.

This is not geography as it was once taught — the travails of Baffin Islanders (grade school), the various forms of desert (high school), or the ocean currents and steppe soils (college). This is geography as it affects the planning and the conduct of military operations, and Collins shows how the physical world influences, limits and sometimes frustrates those operations.

Collins has not restrained himself by adhering only to the physical or land-forms definition of geography. He delves deeply into the works of man, continuing human follies, and the effects of those

works and follies on military operations. There are generous sections on cultural geography, on political-military geography, and on (what should warm the cockles of any 18F's heart) area analysis. Individual chapters cover subjects as varied as natural resources, urbanization, and fortresses and field fortifications. Even space, and its impact on operations, receives a review. Collins earlier published a book on the military influences and use of space, and his chapter on that subject is interesting, informative and authoritative.

In reading *Military Geography*, some readers will undoubtedly find passages that will cause them to say, "I knew that." But those same readers will probably find numerous other passages that will open their eyes to aspects of the world that had previously gone unnoted.

The area-analysis section contains discussions of two major excursions, Operation Neptune and Operation Plan El Paso, that, by themselves, are worth the price of the book. Here, the reader is shown not only what was, and why, but also what was not to be, and why not. The El Paso plan should engender some discussion and possibly some second thoughts among those who think that the results in Southeast Asia would have been

different had there been a different strategy.

The text is sprinkled with modern historical examples that illustrate the impact of the various aspects of geography. Collins cites the appreciation (or the lack of appreciation) for geography in various military triumphs, frustrations and disasters.

Collins contributes the knowledge and the skills he acquired in careers as an Army officer who served in three wars, as a war-college instructor, and as a long-time senior specialist in national defense at the Library of Congress. *Military Geography* is well-organized, the points are well-stated, the style is clear, and Collins' comments are thoroughly soldierly. If there is sometimes a faint note of dogmatism, it can be justified by Collins' masterful assemblage of facts, by his meticulous organization and thorough analysis, and by the reality that there is little that is subjective in the physical world.

There are many books that could earn a place on the professional special operator's shelf for their illustrations of the way particular operations were conducted. There are a much smaller number that qualify as works that should be retained for future reference. *Military Geography* is one of those few. It should stand next to the U.S. Military Academy's military atlases of America's wars, the *Manual for Courts-martial*, and quite possibly, some of Collins' other exceptional works.

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